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Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping how firms read the market. Linking China’s universe of customs shipments to millions of online job ads, we track AI hiring in sales, marketing, and analytics to build a firm-level proxy for non-production AI and map its exposure across products within firms. To structure our analysis, we introduce a model in which firms confront asymmetric information about heterogeneous consumer preferences and show that AI mitigates these frictions by sharpening firms’ ability to learn demand patterns across markets. The model predicts—and the data confirm—that AI-intensive firms fine-tune their product mix and prices with greater precision: they are more likely to export, expand their product lines, and adjust market choices. Crucially, this refinement appears as narrower price dispersion but wider quantity dispersion across destinations—effects strongest for differentiated goods, larger firms, and sales to high-income economies. Together, the evidence shows that AI eases demand-side information frictions, allowing firms to optimize their global reach strategies.

Keywords: artificial intelligence; export behavior; product differentiation

JEL Classification: F14, O14, J24

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1 Introduction

We use data on Chinese exporters to investigate how the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) affects exporters’ behavior. This question is particularly important given the transformative impact that AI can have on business strategy. Empirical evidence from industry reports and business case studies reveals that firms integrating AI into market forecasting significantly outperform those using traditional forecasting methods, reducing prediction errors by approximately 20% to 50%, and consequently experiencing 10-15% gains in sales growth, 20-30% reduce in inventory costs, and improved market alignment.¹ And in China, the growth of AI-powered business analytics and marketing strategies in its foreign trade sector has been praised in industry reports, with Alibaba’s international e-commerce platform that leverages AI to provide sellers market intelligence on consumer trends across 200 foreign markets serving as a prime example of this utility ([China Trade Post, 2023](#)).

By making information processing, communication, and prediction faster, cheaper, and more accurate, AI has the potential to alleviate the significant and costly information frictions that exist in international trade and characterize market dynamics.² In doing so, AI can enhance the process of learning by exporting by improving firms’ ability to collect and analyze market-relevant information, thereby reducing frictions and generating added benefits for those exporters that utilize the technology over those that do not.³

To explore how the adoption of AI affects exporters, we combine China’s universe of customs declarations with millions of online job vacancy (OJV) data for the years 2014 to 2016. The sample period is constrained by the availability of customs data; as such, similar

¹[Singla et al. \(2025\)](#) and [Raskovich et al. \(2025\)](#) provide comprehensive cross-nation analysis on how AI is reshaping business strategies and value creation. [Ozturk \(2024\)](#) and [Pansare \(2024\)](#) compile detailed evidence of AI-powered forecasting and trade performance across regions and sectors, including retail supply chains, food & beverage, fast fashion, and global logistics.

²[Brynjolfsson \(1997\)](#) highlight the role of information technology in enhancing decision-making by reducing the cost of information processing and communication. [Agrawal et al. \(2022\)](#) and [Marwala et al. \(2023\)](#) emphasize AI’s ability to generate better, cheaper, and timelier predictions, partly by filling in missing information. By processing and analyzing large volumes of data, AI reduces the information asymmetries that often exist between parties.

³By *information frictions*, we refer to demand-side factors—such as heterogeneous consumer preferences—that constrain firms’ ability to operate effectively in foreign markets. For theoretical models emphasizing the importance of such frictions in trade dynamics, see [Manova and Zhang \(2012\)](#), [Eaton et al. \(2021\)](#), [Allen \(2014\)](#), among others. [Allen \(2014\)](#) models learning-by-exporting as a sequential process, applied to rice producers in the Philippines; we abstract from such dynamics and instead conceptualize AI as an *added technology* that reduces information asymmetries more efficiently. This logic could, of course, be embedded in a dynamic framework in which AI accelerates and refines learning at each stage, but capturing that process lies beyond the scope of our current analysis. [Arkolakis \(2008\)](#) develops a model in which firms incur increasing marginal *marketing* costs to access additional customers. In spirit, our framework is similar: we introduce a costly technology—AI—that enables firms to better understand the preferences of their *existing* customers, besides other *potential* customers.

to [Aghion et al. \(2025\)](#), who examine AI adoption among French firms between 2017 and 2020, our study sheds light on the early period of AI adoption—prior to the widespread use of large language models.

Following [Babina et al. \(2024\)](#), we treat the situation of AI-oriented hiring as a proxy for firm-level AI adoption. A vacancy is flagged as AI-related when its text contains at least one term from a curated dictionary—e.g., *artificial intelligence*, *machine learning*, *deep learning*, or synonymous Chinese phrases. Aggregating these postings over time produces a granular indicator of a firm’s non-production AI capability. We then apportion that capability across the firm’s products in proportion to their export sales, on the premise that richer transaction histories give AI more data to learn from and thus greater scope to influence decisions at the product level. Out of 3,149,469 online job vacancies posted by 178,358 firms (including both exporters and non-exporters) during this period, we find that 4.6% of all postings contain at least one AI-related keyword. Moreover, 25.5% of firms posted at least one AI-related vacancy. Among the subset of exporters—firms that can be matched to customs data—we find that 6.3% of their postings reference an AI-related skill, and 30.6% of these firms advertise at least one AI-related hire.

Unlike automation technologies and industrial robots, which are primarily adopted to enhance production processes and reduce costs, firms typically leverage AI for predictive analytics, data mining, planning optimization, and pricing optimization.⁴ It is precisely because of these non-production applications that we expect AI to alleviate information frictions in export markets—providing the central motivation for our analysis. To explore this mechanism, we identify a subset of AI-related job postings that reference tasks consistent with these applications. For example, a job posting requiring knowledge of *machine learning* and *tensorflow* is flagged as an AI-related vacancy. If, in addition, the job description includes terms such as *market*, *sell*, *customer*, *business*, *predictive analytics*, or *predictive model*, we also classify the posting as an AI-Sales vacancy.⁵ Among all firms in our sample, we find that 9.68% posted at least one AI-Sales job. Among exporters, this share rises slightly to

⁴A large and growing literature examines how automation affects firms and markets by altering production technologies. For example, [Acemoglu and Restrepo \(2018, 2019\)](#) study the effects of automation on productivity and employment, while [Acemoglu and Restrepo \(2022\)](#) link it to wage inequality. [Agrawal et al. \(2023\)](#) examine AI investment across industries to assess its role in economic growth via production, and [Babina et al. \(2024\)](#) argue that AI fosters growth through product innovation (building on frameworks such as [Hottman et al. \(2016\)](#) and [Argente et al. \(2020\)](#)). Other research investigates the impact of robotics on global value chains and task-based international specialization ([Faber, 2020](#); [Stapleton and Webb, 2020](#); [De Backer and DeStefano, 2021](#); [Krenz et al., 2021](#); [Artuc et al., 2023](#)). Our study contributes to this literature by focusing on how AI adoption influences market outcomes through *non-production* tasks.

⁵In the robustness section, we introduce an alternative classification strategy for identifying AI-Sales hiring. This approach uses SOC-coded occupations such as: 11-2011 (Advertising and Promotions Managers), 11-2021 (Marketing Managers), 13-1161 (Market Research Analysts and Marketing Specialists), and 41-xxxx (Sales and Related Occupations, including supervisors, sales reps, and retail sales workers).

10.85%.

Next, we examine how AI-Sales hiring—which we use as a proxy for AI adoption in terms of sales—affects exporters’ behavior. To structure our analysis, we first introduce a model of heterogeneous firms facing asymmetric information about consumer demand. In this framework, firms do not fully observe consumer preferences for their products when deciding production quantity. Acquiring such information requires a costly technology—namely, AI—that allows firms to uncover the true parameter of consumer tastes and mitigate information frictions. Firms in the model therefore make two key decisions: the quantity to supply, which determines the market clearing price, and whether to adopt AI. We begin by analyzing the model in a closed-economy setting and then extend it to incorporate international trade across multiple countries.

The model yields three core predictions. First, larger and more competitive firms are more likely to adopt AI. Second, AI adoption leads to *lower price dispersion* and *higher quantity dispersion* for a given product across export destinations. Third, AI adoption would result in more market adjustments. The intuition behind these predictions stems from that AI reduces information frictions. In the absence of reliable demand information, firms base their quantity supply decisions on average expected preferences. This leads them to under-supply *strong* markets—those with higher-than-average demand—and over-supply *weak* markets. By adopting AI, firms gain more accurate knowledge of market-specific demand, allowing them to reallocate quantities more efficiently: increasing supply to strong markets and reducing supply to weak ones. As a result, the variance in quantities across markets rises. Prices, by contrast, move in the opposite direction: they fall in strong markets (due to greater supply) and rise in weak markets (due to reduced supply), leading to a decline in price dispersion. This reallocation improves allocative efficiency, which is reflected in a lower aggregate price index. The gains from AI adoption are therefore larger in environments with greater demand uncertainty and heterogeneity.

We then test the model’s predictions using firm-level data. Consistent with the theory, we find that exporters posting AI-related job vacancies are larger and export a wider range of products (at the HS8 level) to more destinations than firms that do not.⁶ Moreover, among exporters that post AI vacancies, those whose postings explicitly reference predictive analytics and market information processing (i.e., AI-Sales jobs) are also larger and exhibit broader product and destination scopes. Our main contribution is to show that AI adoption increases the variance of quantities sold for a given product across export markets, while reducing the variance of its prices. This empirical result aligns closely with the theoretical

⁶Using survey data from French firms, [Aghion et al. \(2025\)](#) also find that firms adopting AI are larger and more productive.

predictions of our model and underscores the role of AI in reducing information frictions and enhancing allocative efficiency across destination markets.

We also test for heterogeneity in the impact of AI and find that the effects are stronger for larger exporters, for differentiated products, and when exporting to developed countries. These findings are consistent with the model’s intuition and are supported by prior research. Larger firms are better positioned to benefit from AI due to their greater access to training data and computational resources (Beraja et al., 2023). Information frictions are more severe for differentiated products than for homogeneous ones (Åkerman et al., 2022). Furthermore, the benefits of learning by exporting are known to be more pronounced when firms serve developed markets (Van Biesebroeck, 2005; De Loecker, 2007).

To ensure the robustness of our results, we conduct a battery of additional tests: First, we exclude firms located in major cities—Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing—as well as firms in the top and bottom 1% of the size distribution, to verify that our findings are not driven by a small number of influential firms or locations. Second, rather than ignoring those observations when sample firms do not appear in the OJV dataset in a certain year, we assume these firms posted zero AI vacancies in this specific year. This helps us test whether selection into the dataset biases the results. Third, we examine whether the effect of AI adoption is stronger for a firm’s core products relative to its non-core products. Fourth, we compare the impact of AI-Sales hiring to general AI hiring to assess whether demand-side applications of AI (e.g., market analysis and prediction) have distinct effects. Fifth, to address concerns about endogeneity and omitted variable bias, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) strategy based on the availability of AI talents due to the proximity of supply of graduates in AI-related fields.⁷ Sixth, we include controls for general Data Analytics hiring to test whether the effect attributed to AI remains significant. Seventh, we implement an alternative measure of AI-Sales hiring using SOC-coded occupations related to sales and marketing. Finally, we conduct a falsification test in which AI adoption is randomly assigned across firms. In all of these cases, our main results remain robust.

Related Literature This paper builds on a growing literature examining the impact of artificial intelligence on firm behavior. While recent macro-level studies fail to find strong evidence of AI on productivity so far (Brynjolfsson and Unger, 2023), micro-level evidence suggests otherwise. For example, Babina et al. (2024) show that AI adoption—measured

⁷In China, university admissions are subject to a quota system determined by a centralized planning process led by the Ministry of Education in coordination with provincial authorities. These quotas—set by major and province—are exogenous to local firms’ contemporary labor demand, making them a valid instrument for AI hiring. We discuss the construction and validity of this instrument in detail later in the paper.

through AI hiring intensity—is associated with labor reallocation, productivity gains, and higher markups, driven largely by product innovation. Similarly, [Alekseeva et al. \(2021\)](#) find that firms hiring for AI roles grow faster and are more likely to innovate. Using French firm-level survey data, [Aghion et al. \(2025\)](#) report that AI-adopting firms are larger, more productive, and more skill-intensive, with higher post-adoption productivity. [Czarnitzki et al. \(2023\)](#) reach similar conclusions using German data, finding that AI improves firms’ information-processing capabilities and productivity. Our paper contributes to this literature by offering new empirical evidence on the effects of AI adoption specifically among exporters. In contrast to existing studies that focus primarily on production-side outcomes, we develop a theoretical framework and empirical strategy to show how AI enhances *allocative efficiency* in non-production tasks—especially through better demand forecasting and sales optimization.⁸

More broadly, this study builds on research using online job vacancy (OJV) data to assess the impact of AI adoption across domains beyond firm performance. Scholars have used such data to examine labor market dynamics ([Deming and Kahn, 2018](#); [Felten et al., 2019](#); [Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022](#); [Antoniades et al., 2025b](#)), the financial sector ([D’Acunto et al., 2019](#); [Grennan and Michaely, 2020](#); [Abis and Veldkamp, 2024](#)), entrepreneurship ([Gofman and Jin, 2024](#)), the demand for STEM education ([Deming and Noray, 2019](#); [Antoniades et al., 2025c](#)), and even political outcomes ([Magistro et al., 2025](#); [Antoniades et al., 2025a](#); [Balcazar, 2023](#)). A key distinction of our work is its focus on the adoption of AI for *sales-related* and *non-production* activities, which is less explored in the existing literature.

Finally, we contribute to a rich literature on information frictions and learning-by-exporting as key determinants of trade performance. Exporting requires information about foreign demand, and information asymmetries can inhibit firm participation and success in international markets ([Manova and Zhang, 2012](#); [Allen, 2014](#); [Raj and Seamans, 2018](#); [Goldfarb et al., 2019b](#); [Eaton et al., 2021](#); [Ferencz et al., 2022](#); [Macedoni, 2022](#)). [Allen \(2014\)](#) attributes up to half of regional price dispersion to information frictions. [Hottman et al. \(2016\)](#) and [Munch and Nguyen \(2014\)](#) highlight how firm-market demand heterogeneity explains much of sales dispersion. More recently, [Kim and Kim \(2024\)](#) show that information frictions account for 40% lower export volumes and 15% higher export concentration in Korean data. [Bai et al. \(2020\)](#), using data from AliExpress, demonstrate how search frictions significantly affect seller performance in global e-commerce. Improving information flow thus enhances trade outcomes: [Steinwender \(2018\)](#), using the historical rollout of the telegraph in 1866, finds that improved communication reduced price levels and volatility while increasing

⁸[Babina et al. \(2025\)](#) study how AI adoption reduces second-moment volatility in firm sales, earnings, and cash flows for U.S. firms. However, they do not offer a mechanism to explain these effects. Our work helps fill this gap by explicitly modeling the role of AI in mitigating information frictions.

trade volumes. Relatedly, Åkerman et al. (2022) show how broadband adoption in Norway affected trade patterns, while Lodefalk et al. (2022) study the role of export credit guarantees in Sweden in mitigating cross-border frictions.

In the learning-by-exporting literature, several studies show that export experience reduces uncertainty and leads to performance gains. Bastos et al. (2018) find that price volatility declines with export experience. Cross-country evidence also supports this view: Van Biesebroeck and Zaurino (2025) show stronger learning effects when exporting to advanced economies in Sub-Saharan Africa; De Loecker (2007) report similar findings using data from Slovenia; and Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) show that firms learn to drop low-performing products and shift toward higher-quality offerings. Our contribution lies in highlighting AI as a new channel that facilitates learning-by-exporting and reduces information frictions. We document new stylized facts on how AI adoption affects the dispersion of prices and quantities across export destinations.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology, Section 5 the baseline results, and Section 6 the robustness checks. We conclude in Section 7.

2 Data and Variable Description

2.1 Data Sources

We study the impact of AI hiring on exporters’ behavior by combining Chinese customs data with data on online job vacancies (OJV) posted by these firms during the same period. The OJV data are scraped from the website of a leading recruitment and human resource services platform in China, beginning in 2014. This job portal offers a comprehensive collection of postings, disaggregated by city, industry, and job type. It covers all four centrally administered municipalities, 293 out of 333 prefecture-level administrative regions, and 59 industries across China.

Each job posting contains structured information on wage offers (reported as a range), non-wage benefits, required education and experience, as well as unstructured textual descriptions of job content, company background, and additional requirements such as language proficiency or computer skills. For a detailed discussion of the dataset, see He et al. (2021). Earlier studies such as Kuhn and Shen (2013) and Fang et al. (2020) also offer valuable references for the use of Chinese online vacancy data.

We merge the OJV dataset with firm-level customs transaction data from the General Administration of Customs of China. The merge is performed using firm names available

in both datasets. The customs data provide detailed information on export transactions by product (at the HS 8-digit level), destination, value, and quantity. Because the customs data are only available through 2016, we limit our analysis to the years 2014 to 2016. To ensure meaningful variation in firm-product-level price and quantity across destinations, we exclude firms with zero export quantities, which is abnormal, or those exporting to only a single market. In total, we identify 177,015 exporters in 2014 and 327,044 in 2016. Of these, we successfully match 4.1% and 3.9% of exporters to the OJV data, respectively. These matched firms account for 12.8% and 21.2% of all posted vacancies and represent 13.9% and 15.2% of total export value in 2014 and 2016, respectively.

2.2 The AI Inputs Measure

Following a growing literature that uses online job vacancy (OJV) data to study the impact of AI on labor markets and firm-level dynamics (Goldfarb et al., 2019a; Alekseeva et al., 2021; Acemoglu et al., 2022; Babina et al., 2024), we measure AI-related hiring by identifying the presence of specific keywords associated with AI in job postings. The list of keywords—such as *machine learning*, *artificial intelligence*, and *supervised learning*—is provided in Table A.1. A job posting is classified as AI-related if it contains at least one keyword from this list. We define a dummy for firm-level AI adoption as 1 if it posts at least one AI-related vacancies up to the current year, and 0 otherwise.

Given our focus on the role of AI in non-production activities—such as marketing, pricing strategy, and customer analytics—we further identify a subset of AI-related postings that reference non-production tasks. We label this measure *AI-Sales*, defined as the dummy of a firm’s AI-related job postings that also include keywords such as *sales*, *marketing*, *customer*, or *business analytics* in the job description.⁹ Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample. Between 2014 and 2016, our dataset contains 3,149,469 job postings by 178,358 firms. On average, 4.6% of postings mention at least one AI-related skill, while 1.4% of postings mention both AI and a non-production-related term. At the firm level, 25.5% of firms post at least one AI-related vacancy, and 7% advertise AI-related jobs for non-production roles.

⁹As a robustness check, we employ an alternative approach that uses occupation-level classifications. Specifically, we flag any AI-related job post that belongs to a non-production occupation (e.g., marketing, advertising, sales) as AI-Sales. We discuss this approach and present corresponding results in the robustness section.

Table 1: Data Description: AI-Related Job Vacancies and Hiring Firms in China, 2014–2016

	Number of firms N (1)	Online job vacancies OJVs (2)	AI-intensity AI (3)	AI-intensity sales AI-sales (4)	Share of firms hiring AI AI-firms (5)	Share of firms hiring AI-Sales AI-sales-firms (6)
<i>Panel A: All firms (Online Job Vacancy Data)</i>						
Overall						
All Years	178,358	3,149,469	4.6%	1.4%	25.5%	7.0%
2014	56,870	832,875	4.4%	1.3%	25.2%	6.7%
2015	61,370	1,108,852	4.5%	1.4%	25.4%	7.0%
2016	60,118	1,207,742	4.7%	1.4%	25.9%	7.2%
By Company scale (employees), all years						
<50	98,069	1,111,279	4.1%	1.4%	19.2%	5.3%
50-150	36,310	605,736	4.5%	1.4%	27.4%	7.5%
150-500	28,969	665,926	5.1%	1.5%	34.4%	9.1%
500-1,000	8,176	303,282	4.6%	1.1%	41.4%	11.0%
1,000-5,000	5,958	364,706	4.7%	1.2%	48.7%	13.8%
5,000-10,000	464	53,588	5.1%	0.9%	47.6%	17.9%
>10,000	412	44,952	8.0%	2.6%	56.3%	22.6%
By industry, all years						
Transportation, storage and postal services	5,916	85,059	2.4%	0.4%	16.0%	2.7%
Accommodation and catering; Wholesale and retail	43,320	599,556	3.3%	1.5%	17.9%	6.0%
Information transmission, software and information technology services	13,827	337,816	6.7%	1.6%	38.8%	11.8%
Public administration; Health; International organization; Electricity, heat, gas and water	1,338	17,198	4.9%	1.1%	27.3%	5.1%
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; Mining	875	8,893	2.8%	0.7%	15.7%	2.5%
Manufacturing	50,167	794,756	5.3%	1.5%	27.8%	6.5%
Residential services, repair and other services; Education; Culture, sports and entertainment	4,107	62,727	3.2%	0.9%	20.1%	4.4%
Scientific research and technology services	22,050	413,170	7.6%	2.3%	37.6%	11.6%
Leasing and business services; Finance	20,925	495,160	2.8%	0.9%	21.4%	5.7%
Construction; Real estate	14,688	315,218	2.4%	0.6%	21.0%	4.9%
Other industry	1,145	19,916	5.4%	0.9%	27.0%	5.7%
<i>Panel B: Subset of firms from customs data matched with OJV data</i>						
Overall						
All Years	31,167	578,714	6.3%	1.9%	30.6%	7.8%
2014	7,254	115,817	5.7%	1.5%	29.7%	6.9%
2015	11,148	203,584	6.1%	1.8%	29.7%	7.6%
2016	12,765	259,313	6.7%	2.0%	31.9%	8.4%

Note: This table reports the summary for AI use in job postings and among firms. AI-intensity means the share of AI job postings among all posts, while AI-intensity sales means the share of AI-sales job postings among all posts. As some industries are small in sample, we aggregate some of them here (and only here, i.e., we still use the disaggregated industry classification reported in Table A.2 in fixed effects regarding industry).

We further disaggregate the data by firm size and industry.¹⁰ Large firms post the highest share of AI-related jobs—8% of all their vacancies—and more than half (56%) of them post at least one AI-related position. Across industries, the highest AI Intensity is found in Scientific Research and Technology Services (7.6%), Information Transmission, Software, and IT Services (6.7%), and a residual “Other Industry” category (5.4%). In contrast, Transportation, Storage, and Postal Services (0.4%), Construction and Real Estate (2.4%), and Leasing, Business Services, and Finance (2.8%) exhibit the lowest intensity. Panel B of Table 1 focuses on the subset of 31,167 firms matched to the customs data. These exporters show a higher AI Intensity (6.3%) compared to the full sample. Notably, even within the short time frame of our sample, the growth in AI-related hiring is more pronounced among exporters—increasing from 5.7% in 2014 to 6.7% in 2016—than among all firms (from 4.4% to 4.7% over the same period).

The data reveal that, as expected, exporters tend to be larger and more likely to utilize AI than non-exporters. To better understand heterogeneity within exporters, we examine whether there are systematic differences between those that employ AI talent and those that do not. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for four groups: exporters without AI hires (Column 1), exporters with AI hires (Column 2), exporters with AI hires excluding AI-Sales (Column 3), and exporters that specifically hire for AI-Sales roles (Column 4).

Table 2: Data Description: Exporter Characteristics by AI Adoption Status and Sales-AI Hiring

	Chinese Exporters			
	AI vs Non-AI		Non Sales vs Sales AI	
	(1) non-AI	(2) AI	(3) non-Sales AI	(4) Sales AI
Number of Firms	21,633	9,534	7,117	2,417
Firm Size:				
p25	17	68	67	73
p50	80	232	230	240
p75	244	643	616	747
Products	33	40	40	42
Markets	16	20	20	22
Avg # Products Per Market	3	3	3	3
Avg Sales Per Product	1,715,785	2,019,746	2,202,278	1,482,269

Notes: This table reports the summary for exporters. Avg # Products Per Market is the average number of products at each market. Avg Sales Per Product is the average sales for each product.

We find that, among exporters, firms hiring AI talent are significantly larger, export a broader range of products, and serve more foreign markets. Furthermore, within the subset of AI-adopting exporters, those that hire for AI-Sales positions tend to be larger and more diversified in terms of products and destinations than those hiring AI talent more generally. However, these differences are not statistically significant.

¹⁰The full list of industries is presented in Table A.2.

3 Theoretical Framework

To frame the analyses that follow and make the operative channels explicit, we develop a heterogeneous firm model with asymmetric information about consumer demand to better understand the implications of AI adoption for exporting firms. Our focus is on the role of AI in enhancing business operations—such as predictive analytics and pricing optimization—rather than on production-side benefits (as would be the case with automation technologies).

A central feature of the model is the assumption that consumer preferences are private information—known only to consumers—which creates a key informational friction. Firms must decide how to allocate output across markets despite this uncertainty. We introduce AI as a costly technology that allows firms to learn about these hidden preferences, thereby mitigating information asymmetries. By incorporating AI into their decision-making, firms can better tailor their offerings across markets. The returns to AI adoption increase with the heterogeneity of market demand—that is, the richer the distribution of consumer preferences, the more valuable AI becomes. This framework enables us to analyze how AI adoption improves firms’ ability to allocate output more efficiently, enhances market targeting, and ultimately affects competition in settings with imperfect information.

3.1 Closed Economy

We begin by describing a closed economy. A continuum of consumers, normalized to measure one, derives utility from consuming differentiated product varieties. The economy is populated by a large number of monopolistically competitive firms, indexed by ω . Each firm produces a unique product variety, differentiated by quality, where firm-specific quality is denoted by $s(\omega)$ and acts as a demand shifter. In addition to firm quality, consumer demand is shaped by heterogeneous tastes for each product. We denote the consumer-specific preference for variety ω as $z(\omega)$, which also acts as a demand shifter. Thus, variation in both $s(\omega)$ and $z(\omega)$ determines firm-level demand. Labor is the only factor of production and wage is normalized to one. Free entry into the market is allowed, and in equilibrium, expected profits are driven to zero by competition.

Consumers Consumers derive utility from consuming differentiated products according to a CES utility function, with a quality shifter as in [Kugler and Verhoogen \(2012\)](#); [Hallak and Sivadasan \(2013\)](#); [Feenstra and Romalis \(2014\)](#); [Macedoni \(2022\)](#). Specifically, the utility function is given by:

$$U = \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega} \left(z(\omega) s(\omega) q(\omega) \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

where $q(\omega)$ represents the quantity of variety ω consumed, and $s(\omega)$ captures the quality of variety ω . We assume $s(\omega)$ is a fixed, firm-specific attribute that does not vary across consumers or markets, representing vertical differentiation.

A key distinction of our model relative to prior literature is the introduction of an additional demand shifter, $z(\omega)$, which reflects consumers' horizontal tastes. This term varies across consumers and destinations, allowing for greater flexibility in modeling heterogeneity. Finally, $\sigma > 1$ denotes the elasticity of substitution, and Ω is the set of producers in the market. The demand function for variety ω is given by:

$$q(\omega) = \frac{z(\omega)^{\sigma-1} s(\omega)^{\sigma-1} p(\omega)^{-\sigma}}{P^{1-\sigma}}$$

where P is the price index, defined as:

$$P \equiv \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega} \left(\frac{p(\omega)}{z(\omega)s(\omega)} \right)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

so that $\frac{p(\omega)}{z(\omega)s(\omega)}$ represents the demand-shifter-adjusted price. It follows that indirect utility is given by $U = P^{-1}$.

Firms There is a continuum of firms, each utilizing labor as the input for production. Products differ along two dimensions: quality, denoted s , and style, represented by the horizontally differentiated variable $z(\omega)$, which varies across consumers and captures taste heterogeneity.

Firms incur a fixed entry cost f_e to draw a quality level s from a continuous distribution $F(s)$, with density $f(s)$ supported on $(0, +\infty)$. Upon observing their draw, firms decide whether to enter. If they do, they pay a fixed production cost f and choose a production level q . Marginal cost is increasing in quality and given by $c = s^\alpha$, with $0 < \alpha < 1$. This reflects that higher-quality production is more labor-intensive but still provides a competitive advantage.

Consumers' preference for product ω is determined by a taste shifter z , drawn independently from a continuous distribution $G(z)$ with support on $[z_l, z_h]$. This leads to heterogeneous demand responses across consumers, even for the same product.

Asymmetric Information on Demand In this framework, we assume that information about consumer preferences is private and known only to consumers. While firms offer vertically differentiated varieties—where higher-priced goods reflect higher quality—consumers exhibit heterogeneous tastes along a horizontal dimension. However, firms are unaware of

these idiosyncratic tastes before entering the market.

To capture this asymmetric information, we model firms' decision-making as a sequential process. First, firms choose their production quantities based on the expected distribution of consumer preferences, without knowing the specific demand realizations they will face. Upon entering the market, firms observe the true value of consumer tastes and subsequently set prices to clear the market and maximize ex-post profits.

This sequential structure—production first, pricing second—not only enhances analytical tractability but also reflects real-world operational constraints. In many industries, firms must commit to production and distribution plans under substantial demand uncertainty, with limited flexibility to adjust afterward. For instance, automobile manufacturers often set production targets months in advance, relying on forecasts, and later use discounts or marketing campaigns to adapt to realized demand. This timing assumption is also standard in the trade literature, including [Arkolakis et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Sager and Timoshenko \(2024\)](#), as a means of modeling firm behavior under informational frictions.

To ensure tractability and the existence of a well-defined equilibrium, we impose mild regularity conditions on the distributions of product quality and consumer taste. Specifically, we assume that the relevant moments of both s and z exist:

Assumption 1 *The random variables s and z have finite $(\sigma - 1)$ -th moments, i.e.,*

$$\mathbb{E}_s[s^{\sigma-1}] < \infty \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}_z[z^{\sigma-1}] < \infty.$$

These conditions ensure that aggregate demand and pricing decisions remain well-defined in equilibrium and allow us to derive closed-form solutions for firm behavior.

Following the procedure outlined earlier, the model can be solved using backward induction. After the firm observes the realized value of consumer demand, $z(\omega)$, it chooses the optimal price to maximize revenue, taking the previously chosen quantity as given. The firm thus solves a standard revenue maximization problem, conditional on both the quantity decision and the observed demand. The detailed derivation of the optimal pricing rule is provided in [Appendix B.1.1](#).

$$p(s, z, q) = (zsP)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} q^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

The price is set so that the goods market clears. The optimal price depends on the product's quality s , the consumer's idiosyncratic taste z , and the quantity q produced by the firm before observing demand. With the price setting rule, we move to the earlier stage where firms make their production decisions—prior to learning the realized demand taste—to maximize expected profits. These expected profits equal expected revenues net of variable production

costs and fixed operating costs:

$$\max_q \mathbb{E}_z \left(p(s, z, q) - c \right) q - f$$

By substituting the ex-post optimal price into this objective, we solve for the ex-ante optimal quantity. The full derivation is provided in the appendix. We then can also calculate the optimal price ex post. The closed-form expressions are:

$$p(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \cdot \frac{z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)} s^\alpha, \quad q(s) = \left[\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \cdot s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} - \alpha} \cdot P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \cdot \mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right]^\sigma \quad (1)$$

The expectations exist by Assumption 1, since $\sigma - 1 > \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}$. Notably, the firm's output decision depends on the expected value of consumer tastes, $\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)$, rather than exact tastes, highlighting the implications of asymmetric information. In the absence of precise knowledge of individual preferences, firms must base production decisions on average expected demand. This induces a misallocation: firms may overproduce goods with lower demand and underproduce those with stronger market appeal. As a result, asymmetric information leads to inefficient product-level allocations in equilibrium—too many low-demand goods, too few high-demand goods.

The ex-post profit can be expressed as:

$$\pi(s, z) = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)} - 1 \right) \left[\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - f.$$

Next, to compute the expected profit the firm faces when it decides whether to stay in the market—before knowing the demand and making the quantity decision—we integrate this ex-post profit function over all possible consumer tastes. The expected profit is given by:

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z)) = \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f, \quad s_p = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}}{((\sigma - 1)P)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}} \quad (2)$$

where s_p represents the quality threshold at which the marginal firm earns zero expected profits. We show the derivation in the appendix. The equilibrium cutoff is determined by the condition of zero expected profits, as implied by free entry, $\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} (\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z))) dF(s) = f_e$. This gives the following equation for the equilibrium cutoff implicitly:

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) = f_e.$$

With the equilibrium value of the quality cutoff, we can derive the remaining key equilibrium variables of the model, including the mass of entrants, the aggregate price index, and the ex-post utility of the representative consumer. These derivations are presented in Appendix B.1.4.

The equilibrium in the model with asymmetric information about consumer preferences is characterized by several conditions. Consumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. Firms maximize profits but earn zero expected profits due to free entry. In addition, both the goods and labor markets must clear. The full set of equilibrium conditions is detailed in Appendix B.1.4, where we also show that the equilibrium can be characterized by solving for a set of variables: the firm-level output decision $q(s)$, the price schedule $p(s, z)$, the cutoff quality level s_p , the mass of entrants N_e , and the aggregate price index P . In Appendix B.1.5, we formally prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under asymmetric information about consumer demand.

3.2 Artificial Intelligence Technology

We next examine the role of AI technology in business operations. As highlighted by both background analysis and anecdotal evidence, the core function of AI deployed by firms in our sample revolves around leveraging advanced techniques and accumulated consumer data to better understand customer behavior, refine product offerings, and optimize production plans.¹¹ By applying machine learning algorithms to these data, firms can uncover emerging trends and evolving consumer preferences. This data-driven approach enables more accurate demand forecasts, allowing firms to better align production and inventory management with market needs. To simplify the analysis—and without loss of generality—we model AI technology as a tool that enables firms to observe consumer preferences in advance, thereby allowing them to make production decisions with full information about demand. This eliminates the information frictions that would otherwise arise from demand uncertainty.

Adopting AI, however, entails substantial upfront costs, including investment in digital infrastructure, the development of tailored algorithms, and the integration of AI into existing workflows. Once implemented and internal capabilities are built, the marginal cost of applying AI to additional production decisions is relatively low. Reflecting this cost structure, we treat AI adoption—including expenditures on AI-related talent—as a fixed cost, largely independent of short-run output. Let f_{AI} denote this fixed cost. To ensure that our theoretical framework matches empirical patterns—namely, that AI adoption remains concentrated among larger firms—we introduce the following assumption.

¹¹A key strength of AI in sales lies in its ability to process vast amounts of consumer data—ranging from purchasing behavior and search patterns to demographic information (Bajari et al., 2015).

Assumption 2 *The fixed cost of AI adoption satisfies:*

$$\frac{f_{AI}}{\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1}) - [\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})]^\sigma} > \frac{f}{[\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})]^\sigma}.$$

Note that $\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1})$ exists by Assumption 1. The condition ensures that AI adoption is costly enough to generate selection: not all firms adopt the technology, and only a subset—typically those with higher quality or larger scale—find it optimal to do so.

Firm Behavior with AI Firms equipped with AI have full information about consumer preferences for their products, denoted by z , prior to making production decisions. This informational advantage allows them to optimize output based on precise demand signals. Consequently, their profit-maximization problem yields the following optimal production quantity and price:

$$q^{AI}(s, z|a) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} - \alpha} (zP)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma, \quad p^{AI}(s, z|a) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} s^\alpha, \quad \forall z.$$

With complete information, the firm treats consumer preferences as exogenously known. The optimal price becomes a constant markup over marginal cost, as in the canonical Melitz framework, and does not vary with z . The benefit of AI lies instead in output flexibility: firms adjust production dynamically in response to heterogeneous demand. When a product is more favored by consumers, firms produce more; when demand weakens, production is scaled back.

In equilibrium, this results in uniform pricing across consumer types and production quantities that vary systematically with consumer tastes:

$$p^{AI}(s, z|a) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} s^\alpha, \quad q^{AI}(s, z|a) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} - \alpha} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma z^{\sigma-1}. \quad (3)$$

Compared to the benchmark without AI, adoption results in more stable prices and significantly lower price dispersion across different realizations of z . Non-AI firms must set output based on expected demand, which leads to mismatches in supply and demand and necessitates price adjustments. In contrast, AI-enabled firms can precisely tailor output to demand conditions and thus rely less on price flexibility to clear the market. This tighter alignment results in price uniformity across destinations and increased dispersion in quantities allocated across markets, reflecting more efficient reallocation. AI thereby enhances firms' ability to implement targeted export strategies and mitigates the inefficiencies stemming from asymmetric information. In effect, AI acts as a demand-revealing technology that

improves allocative efficiency and competitiveness in global markets.

The profit net of fixed costs for a firm adopting AI is given by

$$\pi^{AI}(s, z \mid a) = \frac{1}{\sigma^\sigma} [(\sigma - 1)s^{1-\alpha}zP]^{\sigma-1} - f - f_{AI}.$$

Aggregating over all possible realizations of consumer demand tastes z , we obtain the expected profit for firms using AI:

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z \mid a)) = \frac{\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1})}{\sigma^\sigma} [(\sigma - 1)s^{1-\alpha}P]^{\sigma-1} - f - f_{AI}.$$

Since adopting AI entails an additional fixed cost, not all firms find it profitable to use AI as a tool to mitigate demand uncertainty. As shown in Appendix B.2.1, only firms with sufficiently high product quality choose to integrate AI into their production processes. The quality threshold for AI adoption, denoted by s_a^{AI} , is determined by the following condition:

$$s_a^{AI} = s_p^{AI} \left(\frac{f_{AI} [\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})]^\sigma}{f \left(\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1}) - [\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})]^\sigma \right)} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}} > s_p^{AI}. \quad (4)$$

Under Assumption 2, the threshold for adopting AI exceeds the threshold for simple market entry, i.e., $s_a^{AI} > s_p^{AI}$, as formally proven in Appendix B.2.2. This result reflects the empirical observation that AI adoption is concentrated among higher-quality (and typically larger) firms. Given this, the expected profit for firms that adopt AI (i.e., those with $s \in (s_a^{AI}, \infty)$) is:

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z \mid a)) = \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f + \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI}.$$

For firms that do not adopt AI (i.e., $s \in (s_p^{AI}, s_a^{AI})$), their profits follow the non-AI specification discussed earlier.

In the presence of AI, the equilibrium quality cutoff s_p^{AI} is determined by the zero expected profit condition under free entry. That is,

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) = f_e.$$

Given the relationship between s_p^{AI} and s_a^{AI} , we can jointly solve these equations to determine

the unique equilibrium thresholds. The equilibrium in the scenario where AI technology is available builds upon the case without AI but introduces additional complexity. Specifically, AI generates a new threshold along the quality spectrum: only firms with sufficiently high product quality can afford to adopt AI, while others continue to operate without it. We defer the formal definition of equilibrium to Appendix B.2.3, and establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in Appendix B.2.4.

Importantly, the availability of AI leads to a reallocation of activity toward higher-quality firms. In Proposition 1, we show that the introduction of AI raises the quality threshold for firm survival relative to the benchmark case without AI, where firms make production decisions under incomplete information.

Proposition 1 *With the introduction of AI technology, the quality threshold for firm survival increases compared to a scenario in which firms cannot learn consumer preferences and must treat demand as ex ante uncertain. Formally, the equilibrium quality cutoff satisfies $s_p^{AI} > s_p$.*

The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix B.2.5. This result highlights the *selection effect* introduced by AI adoption. By enabling firms to anticipate demand more precisely, AI enhances the returns to scale from quality and sharpens competitive pressures. Firms with higher-quality products are better positioned to benefit from AI-driven demand insights, while lower-quality firms are more likely to exit. This selection mechanism raises the market participation threshold, reallocates resources toward higher-quality firms, and leads to improved aggregate efficiency in the economy.

3.3 AI in an Open Economy

We now extend the model to an open economy setting to examine how asymmetric information about consumer demand interacts with international trade, and how AI adoption reshapes firms' export behavior. For tractability and generality, we consider a world with $n + 1$ symmetric countries—one domestic economy (indexed by 0) and n foreign economies (indexed by $1, 2, \dots, n$). Firms decide whether to enter each foreign market, facing two trade frictions: a fixed destination-specific export cost f_x , and an iceberg trade cost $\tau > 1$. These costs jointly determine the profitability of serving foreign consumers.

Consumer preferences in each destination d are represented by an idiosyncratic taste term z_d , drawn independently across markets from the same distribution as in the autarky case. Importantly, AI adoption allows firms to better anticipate demand in each foreign market by reducing uncertainty about z_d . This enhanced foresight reshapes firms' export decisions, influencing both market entry and the allocation of quantities across destinations.

To reflect empirical patterns—specifically, that AI adoption is more common among exporters, who tend to be larger and more productive—we introduce a sufficiently high export fixed cost. This generates a sorting equilibrium in which AI adoption is broader than export participation: some firms adopt AI without exporting, but only the most productive firms do both. We formalize this condition as follows:

Assumption 3 *The fixed cost of exporting satisfies the following inequality:*

$$\tau \left(\frac{f_x}{\mathbb{E}_z[z^{\sigma-1}]} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} > \left(\frac{f_{AI}}{\mathbb{E}_z[z^{\sigma-1}] - (\mathbb{E}_z[z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}])^\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$

This assumption ensures that the marginal firm that adopts AI remains less productive than the marginal exporter, resulting in a nested structure of technology adoption and export behavior.

Given the presence of fixed export costs and AI adoption costs, all exporting firms choose to adopt AI, while some non-exporters may opt not to. With countries assumed to be symmetric, wages are identical across markets and normalized to one. For exporters that adopt AI, the optimal quantity allocated to each foreign destination d , characterized by consumer preference parameter z_d , and the corresponding price are given by:

$$q^{AI}(s, z_d|e) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\tau\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha} (z_d P)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma, \quad p^{AI}(s, z_d|e) = \frac{\tau\sigma}{\sigma-1} s^\alpha. \quad (5)$$

Through AI, exporters can now make more informed production decisions, better aligning output with demand conditions in each foreign market. The pricing rule remains a constant markup over marginal cost, adjusted for the iceberg trade cost τ .

Following the same logic and derivations as in the closed economy case—and using equation (5)—we derive the expected profits of domestic firms with ($g = a$) and without AI ($g = p$), as well as exporters using AI ($g = e$). These derivations are detailed in Appendix B.3.2, and the resulting expected profits are summarized below:

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z|g)) = \begin{cases} \frac{\left[\mathbb{E}_z\left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right) \right]^\sigma}{\sigma^\sigma} \left[(\sigma-1)s^{1-\alpha}P \right]^{\sigma-1} - f, & g = p \\ \frac{\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1})}{\sigma^\sigma} \left[(\sigma-1)s^{1-\alpha}P \right]^{\sigma-1} - f - f_{AI}, & g = a \\ \frac{(1+n\tau^{1-\sigma})\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1})}{\sigma^\sigma} \left[(\sigma-1)s^{1-\alpha}P \right]^{\sigma-1} - f - f_{AI} - nf_x, & g = e \end{cases}$$

Due to the presence of fixed costs associated with AI adoption and exporting, the equilibrium is characterized by three distinct firm quality thresholds that define the sorting pattern of firms: (i) s_p^{AI} , which separates non-surviving firms from active producers; (ii) s_a^{AI} , which distinguishes domestic firms that do not adopt AI from those that do; and (iii) s_e^{AI} , which separates AI-adopting domestic firms from exporters. The superscript AI denotes that these thresholds pertain to the equilibrium with access to AI technology.

Under the assumptions outlined earlier, we show in Appendix B.3.2 that only firms with sufficiently high product quality can profitably enter foreign markets. The quality threshold for AI-adopting exporters, s_e^{AI} , is given by:

$$s_e^{AI} = \tau^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} s_p^{AI} \left(\frac{f_x [\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})]^\sigma}{f [\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1})]} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}} > s_a^{AI}.$$

The inequality follows from Assumption 3 and implies a strict sorting hierarchy: $s_p^{AI} < s_a^{AI} < s_e^{AI}$. Intuitively, higher-quality firms are better equipped to absorb the fixed costs associated with both AI adoption and exporting. As a result, they are more likely to upgrade technologies and access foreign markets.

This sorting mechanism is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the distribution of firms along the quality spectrum. Firms with quality below s_p^{AI} exit the market; those with $s_p^{AI} < s < s_a^{AI}$ remain active but do not adopt AI; firms with $s_a^{AI} < s < s_e^{AI}$ adopt AI for domestic production; and those with $s > s_e^{AI}$ adopt AI and export. The corresponding profit profiles across these thresholds are shown in Figure 2. The free entry condition ensures that expected profits of potential entrants equal the entry cost, given by $\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z)) dF(s) = f_e$, which is solved in Appendix B.3.2. As in previous sections, equilibrium entry is pinned down by the labor market clearing condition. Finally, we prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this setting in Appendix B.3.3.




Figure 1: The Sorting Pattern when AI is Available in Open Economy

Impact of AI Adoption on Exporters Having fully described the model, we now examine how the introduction of AI technology alters trade patterns in an open economy. Relative to the baseline equilibrium without AI—where firms face information frictions re-




Figure 2: Relationship between Expected Profit and Quality

garding consumer demand across destinations—AI enables firms to allocate output more efficiently across markets. This improved precision raises expected revenues, prompting entry by higher-quality firms and shifting the composition of producers toward the more productive end of the distribution. As a result, the quality cutoff for active firms increases, reflecting a stronger selection effect.

More formally, we demonstrate in Appendix B.3.5 that, relative to the equilibrium without AI, the introduction of AI leads to the following general equilibrium outcomes:

Proposition 2 *In an open economy, the introduction of AI technology—compared to the case without AI—leads to the following equilibrium outcomes:*

- i) The quality cutoff for active production increases (i.e., $s_p^{AI} > s_p$), reflecting stronger selection into the market;*
- ii) For a given product, (exporting) firms allocate more quantity to high-demand destinations and less to low-demand ones. Prices adjust accordingly—falling where demand is strong and rising where it is weak—resulting in lower price dispersion but greater quantity dispersion across foreign markets;*
- iii) The aggregate price index declines, indicating a welfare gain.*

Notably, Proposition 2 highlights that the ability to anticipate market-specific demand enables firms to reduce price dispersion across destinations. With more accurate information, firms no longer depend on reactive price adjustments to clear unforeseen excess supply or unmet demand. Instead, they adjust output preemptively: prices fall in markets with strong demand and rise where demand is weak, resulting in more uniform pricing across destinations. By contrast, quantity dispersion increases as firms tailor output more precisely to local preferences.

These adjustments improve allocative efficiency. Reallocation of market share toward higher-quality firms—combined with more targeted output decisions—lowers the aggregate price index. Under free entry, AI adoption amplifies these effects by reinforcing firm selection and reducing resource misallocation, ultimately delivering a welfare gain. In the next section, we empirically test these predictions and examine the mechanisms through which AI shapes international trade.

4 Empirical Method

Grounded in the model’s three mechanisms—tighter pricing, finer quantity allocation, and selection into export markets—we now turn to the data. Our empirical strategy uses AI-related sales vacancies (AI-Sales) as a proxy for adopting this predictive, non-production tools. We estimate how this measure shapes four margins of export behavior: (i) entry into and exit from foreign markets, (ii) adjustments in product scope, and (iii–iv) the dispersion of export prices and quantities across destinations. The specifications below translate each theoretical channel into a testable regression, allowing us to evaluate the model’s predictions with firm-level evidence.

For product-level outcomes, we analyze the relationship between a firm’s AI-related hiring and its export behavior by estimating the following regression model:

$$y_{ift} = \alpha + \beta AI_{ift}^S + \delta_{if} + \delta_{ft} + \delta_{it} + \varepsilon_{ift} \quad (6)$$

where the subscripts i , f , and t index product (at the HS-8 level), firm, and year, respectively. The dependent variable y_{ift} represents exporter outcomes of interest, such as variation in exported quantities and prices across destinations, as well as measures of market entry and exit. The key explanatory variable, AI_{ift}^S , captures the exposure of product i to firm f ’s adoption of AI-Sales technologies in year t .

To mitigate potential confounding factors and ensure consistent estimation of the parameters, we include a rich set of fixed effects. Firm-product fixed effects (δ_{if}) control for

time-invariant characteristics at the firm-product level, such as quality or marginal cost. Firm-year fixed effects (δ_{ft}) absorb time-varying firm-level shocks that may affect productivity or strategy. Product-year fixed effects (δ_{it}) capture global shocks or demand changes at the product level. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level to account for within-industry correlation over time.¹²

4.1 Measurement

4.1.1 Output and Price Adjustment

The adoption of AI—proxied by firm-level AI-Sales hiring—may enable exporters to better understand consumer demand and optimize their export strategies. As outlined in Proposition 2, AI adoption improves firms’ ability to identify destination-specific preferences for a given product. This leads to a more targeted allocation of output across markets, resulting in greater dispersion in quantities sold and, conversely, more uniform pricing, as firms no longer need to rely on price adjustments to manage inventory imbalances under uncertainty.

To test this hypothesis, we construct two dispersion measures—one for quantity and one for price—defined as:

$$Var(q)_{ift} = \left(\frac{\sum_{d \in D_{ift}} (q_{ifdt} - \bar{q}_{ift})^2}{|D_{ift}|} \right), \quad Var(p)_{ift} = \left(\frac{\sum_{d \in D_{ift}} (p_{ifdt} - \bar{p}_{ift})^2}{|D_{ift}|} \right) \quad (7)$$

where q_{ifdt} and p_{ifdt} denote, respectively, the quantity and price of product i exported by firm f to destination d in year t . The terms $\bar{q}_{ift}$ and $\bar{p}_{ift}$ represent the average quantity and price across all destinations D_{ift} served by that firm-product-year combination.

The resulting variables $Var(q)_{ift}$ and $Var(p)_{ift}$ capture the cross-destination variance in quantities and prices, respectively. To ensure these measures are meaningful, we restrict the sample to firm-product pairs that are exported to at least two destinations in a given year. A higher value of $Var(q)_{ift}$ indicates greater variation in quantities allocated across destinations—suggesting more effective matching between supply and local demand. A lower value of $Var(p)_{ift}$ reflects reduced price dispersion—suggesting that firms rely less on price variation to cope with uncertain demand. In our regressions, we take the natural logarithm

¹²For firm-level outcomes such as selection into exporting and product scope, we use the specification $y_{f(cj)t} = \alpha + \beta AI_{ft}^S + \delta_f + \delta_{ct} + \delta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{f(cj)t}$. In these specifications, we include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics, industry-year fixed effects to absorb sector-specific shocks, and city-year fixed effects to account for location-specific policies or economic conditions. All regressions employ robust standard errors clustered at the industry level.

of these dispersion measures.

In addition to analyzing changes in price and quantity dispersion, we also examine how a firm’s adoption of AI affects its decisions to enter or exit export markets at the product level. To do so, we construct measures of market entry and exit by comparing each firm-product’s set of export destinations in year t to the baseline year, 2013. A destination is classified as a market entry if product i is exported to destination d in year t , but not in 2013; similarly, a destination is counted as a market exit if it was served in 2013 but not in year t . We define N_{ift}^{entry} and N_{ift}^{exit} as the number of market entries and exits, respectively, for each firm-product-year observation. At the firm level, we construct additional measures to capture export participation and product scope. The binary variable $\mathbb{I}_{ft}^x$ equals one if firm f exports in year t , and zero otherwise, capturing the extensive margin of export activity. To quantify the firm’s product scope, we define N_{ft}^{pdt} as the number of distinct HS8-level product categories exported by firm f in year t .

4.1.2 Exposure to AI Technology

To study the impact of AI adoption in non-production activities on exporters, we construct a product-level measure of exposure to AI-Sales technology. As described in Section 2, we first identify whether a firm has posted a job vacancy that includes both an AI-related skill and a reference to a sales-related activity in its job description. Based on this classification, we define a firm-year binary indicator AI_{ft}^S , which equals one if firm f has posted at least one AI-Sales vacancy by year t , and zero otherwise. Once a firm begins hiring for AI-Sales roles, this indicator remains equal to one in all subsequent years.

We then assign product-level exposure within the firm based on the importance of each product in the firm’s export portfolio. Specifically, for each exporting product i , we define:

$$AI_{ift}^S = Share_{if,2013} \times AI_{ft}^S, \quad (8)$$

where $Share_{if,2013}$ is the share of product i in firm f ’s total export value in the baseline year 2013, calculated as:

$$Share_{if,2013} = \frac{x_{if,2013}}{\sum_{i \in I_{f,2013}} x_{if,2013}},$$

with $x_{if,2013}$ denoting the export value of product i by firm f in 2013, and $I_{f,2013}$ the set of all products exported by the firm in that year.

We allow for heterogeneity in exposure to AI within firms for three main reasons. First, prior research shows that firms tend to prioritize their core products—those with higher

sales volumes—when allocating strategic resources.¹³ Second, products with larger export volumes generate more transactions, which enable better training for predictive algorithms used in pricing, inventory management, and demand forecasting.¹⁴ Third, weighting more heavily the products that account for greater sales reduces the risk of measurement error.

This construction provides a more precise and targeted proxy for AI exposure than the alternative assumption that all products benefit equally from AI adoption. In addition, by fixing product-level weights to their 2013 baseline levels, we ensure that estimated effects are driven by changes in AI adoption, not changes in product mix. In the robustness section, we also consider a specification with a dummy variable distinguishing between core and non-core products without using the exact share information; the results remain consistent.

4.2 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Strategy

Both components of our exposure measure—namely, the initial product share $\text{share}_{if,2013}$ and the firm-level AI adoption indicator AI_{ft}^S used in equation (8)—may raise concerns about endogeneity. The initial product share may capture persistent firm-product characteristics—such as core competencies or historical comparative advantage—that may also influence export performance and outcomes. To mitigate this concern, we include firm-product fixed effects (δ_{if}) in all regressions, which absorb time-invariant heterogeneity, including the baseline product advantages.

A second concern is that AI adoption itself may be endogenous to changes in demand or supply-side conditions. For example, firms experiencing greater dispersion in sales performance across destinations may be more inclined to adopt AI to improve targeting through pricing, marketing, or inventory decisions. Similarly, productivity shocks—such as improvements in management practices or production technologies—could simultaneously increase the likelihood of AI adoption and enhance firms’ export allocation capabilities. These unobserved confounders may bias OLS estimates. We thus control for firm-year fixed effects in our baseline regression to ensure that the comparison is made within firms.

To further address this problem, we develop an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that leverages exogenous variation in the regional supply of AI-skilled labor. Our instrument exploits a distinctive feature of China’s higher education system: the centralized planning of university admissions. Each year, the Ministry of Education (MoE), in collaboration with provincial authorities and universities, determines enrollment quotas by field of study and

¹³Bernard et al. (2007) show that exporters disproportionately emphasize products tied to their core competencies, suggesting firms strategically allocate resources to higher-value goods.

¹⁴Dickstein and Morales (2018) find that higher export volumes provide firms with more information about market conditions, reinforcing the link between data scale and learning.

region. These quotas are guided by national policy priorities and long-term labor market projections—not the short-term hiring needs of individual firms.¹⁵

Based on this institutional context, we construct a firm-level measure of potential access to AI talent using the geographic distribution of university admissions in AI-related fields. Specifically, we define:

$$AI_{ft}^{IV} = \sum_{u \in U} \frac{1}{dist_{fu}} \times AIQuota_{u,t-1}, \quad (9)$$

where $dist_{fu}$ denotes the geographic distance between firm f and university u , and U is the set of all universities in China. The term $AIQuota_{u,t-1}$ captures the number of students admitted to AI-related majors—such as computer science, data science, or artificial intelligence—at university u in year $t - 1$. These data are compiled annually by the Ministry of Education based on officially approved enrollment plans.

By using lagged quotas, we mitigate reverse causality and ensure that the variation reflects policy-driven supply shocks rather than firm-specific labor demand. The measure AI_{ft}^{IV} captures the distance-weighted supply of newly trained AI graduates available to each firm. Firms located closer to universities with large AI admission quotas are more likely to benefit from easier access to relevant talent.¹⁶ In our empirical analysis, we instrument AI_{ift}^S using AI_{ft}^{IV} , which replaces AI_{ft}^S in equation (8). Additionally, we also use specifications which control for other forms of non-sales AI adoption and data analysis capabilities. The instrumented exposure variable is denoted AI_{ift}^{IV} .

5 Empirical Results

5.1 Baseline Results

We begin by presenting the baseline regression results from equation (6), which estimate the impact of AI adoption on the dispersion of prices and quantities for a given firm-product across export destinations. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. Columns (1) and

¹⁵In China, university admissions are centrally managed by the Ministry of Education (MoE) in coordination with provincial education authorities. Enrollment quotas in fields such as AI and engineering are set based on national development strategies and long-term labor market forecasts, rather than temporary firm-specific hiring needs, especially not those stemming from which the university is located at. Although universities propose intake targets, these are subject to approval and aligned with centrally determined priorities. See: [MoE 2016 Enrollment Guidelines](#).

¹⁶Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates the geographic distribution of AI university quotas and firm-level AI hiring intensity. Green dots represent universities with substantial AI-related enrollment, and shading indicates the density of AI-related vacancies by prefecture. The visual correlation suggests a meaningful overlap between talent supply and AI hiring demand.

(3) show the coefficients for price and quantity dispersion, respectively. To account for the possibility that the number of export destinations may mechanically influence the dispersion measures, Columns (2) and (4) include controls for the (log) number of destinations.

The results reveal a clear pattern. For firms that post AI-related sales vacancies, price dispersion across markets declines for products that comprised a larger share of the firm’s exports in the baseline year (2013)—as shown in Columns (1) and (2). In contrast, quantity dispersion increases significantly for these same products, as reported in Columns (3) and (4). The inclusion of controls for the number of export destinations does not alter the magnitude or significance of these estimates.

These findings are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical framework: by reducing demand-side information frictions, AI adoption enables firms to reallocate quantities more effectively toward destinations with stronger demand while harmonizing prices across markets.

Table 3: Impact of AI Adoption on Cross-Market Price and Quantity Dispersion

Dep var.	(1) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(2) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(3) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(4) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$
<i>Panel A: Price and Quantity Dispersion Across Destinations</i>				
AI_{ift}^S	-2.187*** (0.497)	-2.202*** (0.526)	0.309** (0.137)	0.304** (0.129)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$		0.760*** (0.014)		0.413*** (0.018)
Observations	106,510	106,510	105,210	105,210
Adjusted R^2	0.788	0.793	0.902	0.903
<i>Panel B: Price and Quantity Dispersion Across All Transactions</i>				
AI_{ift}^S	-2.508*** (0.514)	-2.490*** (0.541)	0.266** (0.122)	0.278** (0.121)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$		0.794*** (0.011)		0.393*** (0.010)
Observations	113,250	113,250	111,820	111,820
Adjusted R^2	0.778	0.783	0.900	0.901
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>				
Firm-HS 8-digit	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y
HS 8-digit-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Panel A reports dispersion in prices and quantities across destinations within a firm–product–year, calculated as the variance in average unit prices and quantities sold across all destination markets that the firm serves with that product in a given year, as defined in equation (7). Panel B measures dispersion across individual transactions within each firm–product–year, using the full set of shipment-level trade flows, including repeated transactions to the same destination. $\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$ and $\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$ denote the log number of destinations and total transactions, respectively, for firm f selling product i in year t . Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Transaction-Level Robustness. In the baseline estimations, we aggregate export transactions at the product-destination-year level before computing dispersion measures. As a robustness check, we construct dispersion measures at the transaction level by calculating the variance in prices and quantities across all transactions for a given firm-product-year.¹⁷

Panel B of Table 3 presents the regression results using these transaction-level dispersion measures. Consistent with the baseline findings, we observe that price variance is negatively associated with a product’s AI-Sales exposure, while quantity variance is positively associated. These results reinforce our interpretation that AI-Sales adoption enhances firms’ ability to coordinate pricing across destinations while reallocating output toward markets with stronger demand. The IV specification results in Table 4 provide additional support. The first-stage regression in Column (1) confirms the instrument’s strong predictive power for AI-sales use intensity, while Columns (2)-(5) report IV estimates for price and quantity deviations that closely mirror the baseline findings. This consistency across different specifications lends robust support to our main conclusions.

Other Export Performance. To further explore how AI adoption shapes firm behavior in export markets, we examine adjustments along the extensive margin of markets, which we define at the firm-product level based on the entry into and exit from export markets. In Column (1) of Table 5, we first examine the number of new destination markets a firm-product pair enters relative to 2013. The coefficient on AI use is positive and statistically significant, indicating that products with a higher initial export share are more likely to expand into new markets after the adoption of AI. Column (2) focuses on market exits—counting the number of destinations served in 2013 but dropped in year t . Again, AI use shows a significantly positive effect. These patterns align with the model’s prediction: AI reduces information frictions and enhances the ability of firms to know more about potential demand across foreign markets. Armed with better information and insights, firms can target markets that exhibit stronger demand signals, while exiting less profitable ones. In essence, AI empowers firms to make smarter and more strategic export decisions, improving their ability to match products with the right markets.

Next, we study the extensive margin of export by considering adjustments at the firm level. The results are presented in Columns (3) to (6). The regression specification here mirrors that of the baseline specification but is estimated at the firm level. The dependent

¹⁷Specifically, we define transaction-level dispersion as $Var(q)_{ift} = \sum_{e \in E_{ift}} (q_{ifet} - \bar{q}_{ift})^2 / |E_{ift}|$ and $Var(p)_{ift} = \sum_{e \in E_{ift}} (p_{ifet} - \bar{p}_{ift})^2 / |E_{ift}|$, where q_{ifet} and p_{ifet} denote the quantity and price of product i sold by firm f in transaction e in year t , and $\bar{q}_{ift}$, $\bar{p}_{ift}$ are the corresponding means across all transactions E_{ift} .

Table 4: AI Adoption on Cross-Market Price and Quantity Dispersion: IV Estimates

Dep var.	(1) First Stage AI_{ift}^S	(2) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(3) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(4) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(5) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$
<i>Panel A: Price and Quantity Dispersion Across Destinations</i>					
AI_{ift}^{IV}	0.108*** (0.011)				
AI_{ift}^S		-31.79*** (4.629)	-31.31*** (4.526)	1.412** (0.597)	1.676** (0.653)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$			0.756*** (0.015)		0.413*** (0.018)
Observations	106,500	106,500	106,500	105,200	105,200
F Statistics	99.31				
<i>Panel B: Price and Quantity Dispersion Across All Transactions</i>					
AI_{ift}^{IV}	0.107*** (0.011)				
AI_{ift}^S		-37.04*** (5.629)	-36.36*** (5.511)	1.706*** (0.567)	2.057*** (0.615)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$			0.784*** (0.013)		0.394*** (0.010)
Observations	113,240	113,240	113,240	111,810	111,810
F Statistics	97.62				
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>					
Firm-HS 8-digit	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
HS 8-digit-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Panel A reports IV results on the dispersion of prices and quantities across destinations for each firm-product-year, measured as the variance in average unit prices and quantities sold across all destination markets served with that product, as defined in equation (7). Panel B reports dispersion measured across individual transactions within each firm-product-year, using the full set of shipment-level records, including repeated transactions to the same destination. The variables $\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$ and $\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$ denote the log number of export destinations and total transactions, respectively, for firm f exporting product i in year t . We control for AI not identified as for sales purpose (AI_{ift}^{NS}) and other data technology ($Data_{ift}$). Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5: AI Adoption and Export Entry, Exit, and Scope

Dep var.	(1) N_{ift}^{entry}	(2) N_{ift}^{exit}	(3) $\mathbb{I}_{ft}^x$	(4) $\mathbb{I}_{ft}^x$	(5) N_{ft}^{pdt}	(6) N_{ft}^{pdt}
AI_{ift}^S	0.971** (0.358)	0.301** (0.116)				
AI_{ft}^S			0.019*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.062** (0.025)	0.069** (0.027)
Observations	214,742	214,742	133,883	131,704	29,422	28,642
Adjusted R^2	0.815	0.896	0.739	0.736	0.901	0.904
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>						
Firm-HS 8-digit	Y	Y				
Firm-Year	Y	Y				
HS 8-digit-Year	Y	Y				
Firm			Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year			Y	-	Y	-
City-Year			Y	-	Y	-
Industry-City-Year			-	Y	-	Y

Note: Variables N_{ift}^{entry} and N_{ift}^{exit} denote the number of destination markets newly entered and exited, respectively, for each firm-product-year observation. At the firm level, the binary indicator $\mathbb{I}_{ft}^x$ equals one if firm f engages in exporting in year t , and zero otherwise. N_{ft}^{pdt} represents the number of distinct HS 8-digit product categories exported by firm f in year t . Columns (1) and (2) report results from firm-product-level regressions, where the dependent variables are the number of newly entered and exited export markets, relative to each product's 2013 market portfolio. Columns (3) through (6) present firm-level regressions. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is export status $\mathbb{I}_{ft}^x$, while in Columns (5) and (6), it is the product scope N_{ft}^{pdt} , conditional on exporting. Columns (3) and (5) include firm, industry-year, and city-year fixed effects, while Columns (4) and (6) replace industry-year and city-year fixed effects with industry-city-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

variable captures either export participation (Columns (3) and (4)) or product scope—the number of HS8-digit varieties exported, conditional on exporting (Columns (5) and (6)). The key explanatory variable, AI_{ft}^S , indicates whether a firm adopts AI-related sales technology in year t . In all specifications where applicable, we control for firm fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects that capture industry level shocks, and city-year fixed effects that capture city-year-specific shocks. In Columns (4) and (6), we report estimates that include industry-city-year fixed effects. Results are robust across specifications, with standard errors clustered at the industry level. We find that AI adoption increases the probability of exporting by 1.9 percentage points. Given a baseline export rate of 23%, this corresponds to roughly an 8.3% increase in the number of firms that export. Conditional on exporting, AI-adopting firms also export 0.06 to 0.07 more product varieties.

5.2 Heterogeneous Effects of Sales-Oriented AI Adoption

Product Differentiation. In Panel A of Table 6, we explore heterogeneity by distinguishing between differentiated and homogeneous products. Since differentiated products are more likely to be shaped by variations in consumer preferences—and where love-of-variety effects are stronger—we expect sales AI to have a greater impact in this segment. To test this, we begin by separating products into non-intermediate and intermediate categories.¹⁸ Non-intermediate goods are typically purchased by end consumers, for whom taste, design, and other demand-side attributes play a central role in purchase decisions. By contrast, intermediate goods are primarily procured by firms or manufacturers based on functional specifications, making them less sensitive to consumer preferences and thus less likely to benefit from sales-oriented AI applications. This argument leads us to focus on non-intermediate goods. We interact AI_{ift}^S with a dummy variable $Diff_i$, indicating whether product i is classified as differentiated. The coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant and have the expected signs, confirming that the effects of sales AI are indeed amplified for differentiated goods.

Firm Size. We explore heterogeneity by firm size, classifying firms into small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large firms. We interact AI_{ift}^S with a dummy $Large_i$ which indicates whether the firm is a large one. Columns (1)–(4) of Panel B in Table 6 present results for dispersion across destinations, while Columns (5)–(8) report those for dispersion across transactions. We find that the effect of AI is larger for large firms, though the

¹⁸Product groupings are based on the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification, mapped to HS 8-digit codes using the official correspondence provided by the United Nations Statistics Division (<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/classifications/econ/>).

Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects

Dep var.	(1) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(2) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(3) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(4) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(5) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(6) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(7) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(8) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$
<i>Panel A: By Product Differentiation</i>								
$AI_{ift}^S \times Differentiated_i$	-1.453*** (0.316)	-1.136** (0.261)	2.096*** (0.646)	2.241*** (0.690)	-1.225*** (0.405)	-0.854*** (0.342)	2.132*** (0.631)	2.288*** (0.671)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$		Y		Y				
$\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$						Y		Y
Observations	42,976	42,976	42,096	42,096	45,056	45,056	44,088	44,088
Adjusted R^2	0.800	0.805	0.901	0.902	0.792	0.797	0.899	0.900
<i>Panel B: By Firm Size</i>								
$AI_{ift}^S \times Large_f$	-1.235 (0.732)	-1.210 (0.740)	0.950*** (0.287)	0.968*** (0.270)	-0.957 (0.637)	-0.857 (0.652)	1.125*** (0.334)	1.180*** (0.315)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$		Y		Y				
$\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$						Y		Y
Observations	106,510	106,510	105,210	105,210	113,250	113,250	111,820	111,820
Adjusted R^2	0.788	0.793	0.902	0.903	0.778	0.783	0.900	0.901
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>								
Firm-HS 8-digit	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
HS 8-digit-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>Panel C: By Destination Market</i>								
$AI_{ift}^S \times Developed_g$	-0.0439 (0.861)	-0.153 (0.808)	0.656** (0.294)	0.605** (0.321)	-0.255 (0.585)	-0.334 (0.543)	0.791*** (0.263)	0.761*** (0.290)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ifgt}$		Y		Y				
$\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ifgt}$						Y		Y
Observations	116,996	116,996	115,620	115,620	127,272	127,272	125,722	125,722
Adjusted R^2	0.774	0.779	0.891	0.892	0.765	0.770	0.889	0.890
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>								
Firm-HS 8-digit-Destination Group	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-Destination Group-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
HS 8-digit-Destination Group-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Panel A examines heterogeneity by product differentiation. Panel B examines heterogeneity by firm size. Panel C examines heterogeneity by destination type. Columns (1)–(4) report price and quantity dispersion across destinations, and Columns (5)–(8) across transactions. Dispersion is calculated as the variance in average unit prices and quantities defined in equation (7). $\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$ denotes the log number of export destinations for firm f selling product i in year t , and $\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$ denotes the log number of export transactions for firm f selling product i in year t . In panel C, $\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ifgt}$ and $\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ifgt}$ denotes the log number of export destinations and transactions within destination group g for firm f selling product i in year t respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

difference for price dispersion is not precisely estimated, while that for quantity dispersion is significant at 1%. This contrast highlights a key feature of AI adoption: its effectiveness depends on access to rich data, which larger firms are more likely to possess. In this sense, AI may amplify pre-existing differences in capabilities, widening the performance gap between small and large firms. This echoes the insight in [Dickstein and Morales \(2018\)](#) that larger firms are better equipped to learn about foreign market conditions.

Market Income and Consumer Preferences. We further explore heterogeneity at the destination level by separating markets into developed and developing economies. While the dependent variables remain defined as in equation (7), we now compute price and quantity dispersion separately within each group of destinations. We interact AI_{ift}^S with a dummy $Developed_g$ indicating whether the dispersion is within developed countries. In this specification, we control the triple fixed effects as Firm-HS 8-digit-Destination Group, Firm-Destination Group-Year and HS 8-digit-Destination Group-Year. Columns (1)–(4) of Panel C in Table 6 present results for dispersion across destinations, while Columns (5)–(8) report those for dispersion across transactions. The effects of sales AI are particularly pronounced in developed markets, especially with respect to quantity dispersion. This pattern is consistent with the idea that consumer preferences are more diverse—and more consequential—in high-income economies, where product characteristics such as design, features, and brand differentiation play a central role in purchasing decisions.¹⁹ Overall, the results further validate the interpretation that the primary function of sales AI lies in enhancing demand-side information precision—especially where consumer preferences are most varied and complex.

Overall, we find that sales-oriented AI is most effective in environments where consumer heterogeneity plays a central role. Its impact is especially pronounced for non-intermediate differentiated goods, where products are less standard and end consumers base purchasing decisions on taste, design, and other subjective attributes. In these settings, the ability to interpret and respond to diverse demand signals becomes a strategic advantage—one that tends to benefit larger firms disproportionately. With access to richer data and greater analytical capacity, these firms are better equipped to translate AI-driven insights into actionable market strategies. The effectiveness of sales AI also varies systematically across destination markets. In developed economies, where consumers exhibit greater preference diversity and assign higher value to product features, the gains from demand-side learning

¹⁹A well-established literature documents a positive relationship between income per capita and the variety of goods consumed, including imported varieties—see [Jackson \(1984\)](#), [Hunter and Markusen \(1988\)](#), and [Simonovska \(2015\)](#). Greater demand heterogeneity in richer countries increases the potential value of AI in identifying and responding to nuanced consumer tastes. Moreover, [Allen \(2014\)](#) show that the cost of learning about foreign demand is especially high in developing countries, making precise targeting via AI more effective in advanced markets.

are more substantial.

6 Robustness Analysis

We perform a variety of sensitivity checks to ensure the robustness of our results. Specifically, we remove outliers, treat missing job vacancies differently, experiment with alternative definitions of AI exposure, alternative definitions of Sales-AI, and compare Sales-AI with other types of AI. We also present a falsification test to rule out the influence of unobserved stochastic trends.

Removing Influential Observations. Given that firms with strong AI demand are often concentrated in major municipalities with better talent access and more technology-intensive environments, we re-estimate our regressions excluding firms located in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing. Panel A of Table A.4 presents these results. The coefficient on AI_{ift}^S in the price dispersion regression remains significantly negative at the 1% level, with only a slight reduction in magnitude relative to the baseline estimates. In the quantity dispersion regression, the coefficient remains positive but becomes marginally significant at the 10% level, due to the reduced sample size. Nonetheless, the point estimates remain comparable in magnitude to the main results.

We also winsorize the AI variable at the top and bottom 1% and report estimates in Panel B. We do this to ensure that our results are not driven by a handful of firms where there exist vast comparative advantage differences in the products and the most competitive products account for the majority of AI investments—such as major products expanding rapidly into global markets. Despite the removal of outlier observations, the coefficients and their significance levels remain very similar to the baseline results, which confirms that our findings reflect broader trends among all products, and not just a handful of outliers.

Addressing Missing Job Vacancies. Firms may not consistently post AI-related job vacancies online each year, and the unavailability of postings could introduce bias if it occurs systematically.²⁰ To address this concern, we adopt the following modification in our analysis: we treat missing vacancy data as indicative of zero AI-related recruitment activity. This conservative approach assumes that in years without observed postings, firms do not actively recruit AI sales staff, thus aligning the constructed measure more closely with the actual

²⁰For instance, if vacancies are more likely to be posted during periods of rapid growth or expansion, our measure could overstate AI adoption by capturing only the most active periods. Conversely, if firms invest in AI capabilities without public postings—such as through internal promotions—missing observations could lead us to understate adoption.

hiring behavior of firms. Panel C of Table A.4 presents the results using this adjusted measure. The estimated coefficients are similar to the baseline results and retain their statistical significance, reinforcing the robustness of the relationship between AI adoption and firms’ export reallocation behavior.

Adjusting Product Shares and Core Product Identification. Our main specification interacts a firm’s AI-Sales adoption decision, AI_{ft}^S , with each product’s export share within the firm in the initial year. However, since export shares can be mechanically influenced by the number of varieties a firm sells, this raises comparability concerns across firms. To address this, we first normalize each product’s share by the firm’s highest export share, rescaling the core product to one. Using this adjusted measure, we re-estimate the regressions. As shown in Panel D of Table A.4, the coefficients on AI_{ift}^S remain highly significant with the expected signs, although somewhat smaller in magnitude due to the change in scale.

As a further check, we also replace the continuous share measure with a dummy variable that indicates whether a product is the firm’s top-selling product. This alternative specification effectively implements a triple-difference framework that compares changes in price and quantity dispersion between core and non-core products before and after AI adoption. The results, reported in Panel E, again show that AI-Sales adoption leads to a larger reduction in price dispersion and a greater increase in quantity dispersion for core products relative to others, reinforcing the interpretation that AI adoption improves firms’ ability to allocate output more efficiently across products.

Differentiating the Effects of Sales and Non-Sales AI. So far, our focus has been on the hiring of AI talent for non-production activities, which we call AI-Sales. Here, we expand the analysis to consider overall AI hiring (one that does not distinguish between the tasks performed) and AI for production activities (simply defined as job posts that mention AI skills but none of the non-production keywords).²¹

If the mechanism we propose here operates primarily through learning about market demand, then we should expect the measure of non-sales AI to have a significantly lower impact on the constructed measures of price and quantity dispersions. To check this, we construct a new measure, AI_{ift}^{NS} , following the definition of AI_{ift}^S in equation (8), except that

²¹Using the AI-related keywords listed in Table A.1, we identify all AI-related vacancies and exclude those classified as sales AI, constructing a measure of non-sales AI hiring. Non-sales AI may affect price dispersion if it leads to uniform reductions in marginal costs across all destinations. By improving production efficiency, non-sales AI could compress price variation mechanically, even though it does not directly influence firms’ strategic market allocation decisions. But we expect no significant effects of non-sales AI on quantity dispersion.

AI_{ft}^{NS} now indicates whether firm f hires non-sales AI workers by year t . We substitute this alternative measure into the baseline regression framework.

Panels A and B of Table A.5 report the results. In Panel A, focusing on cross-market dispersion, we find that when compared to the baseline specification, non-sales AI adoption has no meaningful effect on quantity dispersion and only a modest impact on reducing price dispersion. The absence of any impact on quantity dispersion is particularly important, as quantity adjustment is the key channel through which firms reallocate output in response to improved market demand information. The modest decline in price dispersion may simply reflect production-side improvements, such as reductions in marginal costs across all destinations, which compress prices without materially altering firms' market allocation decisions. Panel B, based on transaction-level dispersion, yields similar results and reinforces the robustness of our main interpretation.

In Panel C, we pool all AI adoption together without distinguishing between sales and non-sales applications. The results closely mirror those from our baseline regressions. As expected, the estimated magnitudes fall between those obtained using sales AI solely, reflecting the fact that sales-related applications dominate AI adoption in our setting.²²

Controlling for Broader Data Technology Adoption. One potential concern is that firms' AI adoption decisions may simply reflect a broader capability in applying digital technologies, rather than an AI-specific mechanism. To address this, we construct a separate keyword list that captures other types of data technologies unrelated to AI (see Table A.1) and create a corresponding measure, $Data_{ift}$, analogous to AI_{ift}^S but focused on general data technology use. We then include $Data_{ift}$ as an additional control variable in our baseline regressions to isolate the specific effect of AI adoption. Panel D of Table A.5 reports the results. Even after controlling for general data technology adoption, the coefficients on AI_{ift}^S remain significant and retain their expected signs, which suggests that AI adoption continues to play a distinct role in reducing price dispersion and raising quantity dispersion. In contrast, general data technology use, much like non-sales AI, is associated with lower price dispersion but shows no effect on quantity dispersion.

In Panel E, we further include both $AI\ Nonsales_{ift}$ and $Data_{ift}$ as additional controls alongside AI_{ift}^S . The results show that the effects of sales AI remain strong and significant, even after we account for the impact of non-sales AI and general data technology adoption.

²²As a cross-check, Table A.7 examines the relationship between AI adoption and firm-level productivity. We find that non-sales AI—targeted at production, logistics, and management operations—is significantly associated with higher productivity, while sales-related AI has no discernible effect. This pattern reinforces that the effects we document for sales AI reflect targeted improvements in demand-side reallocation rather than broader gains in operational efficiency.

While non-sales AI and general data technology contribute modestly to reducing price dispersion, only sales AI has a distinct and statistically significant impact on quantity dispersion—the key dimension through which firms reallocate output across markets. This distinction provides further validity in support of the mechanism we document that ties the benefits of AI use to demand-side learning.

Classifying AI Vacancies by Occupation. To provide a more systematic classification of AI-related vacancies, we adopt an alternative approach based on Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes.²³ Specifically, we match each job vacancy to its corresponding SOC code and identify whether it belongs to sales, production, or other occupations. A firm is classified as adopting “sales AI” if it posts at least one AI-related vacancy linked to a sales occupation based on SOC; similarly, “production AI” is defined using vacancies classified into production occupations. Using these SOC-based classifications, we reconstruct the AI adoption variables and re-estimate the regressions. Results are presented in Table A.6, with Columns (1) and (2) focusing on sales AI and Columns (3) and (4) focusing on production AI.

Panel A of Table A.6 reports results for price dispersion. Products with a higher initial export share see a larger reduction in price dispersion following sales AI adoption, consistent with our baseline, and the magnitude closely matches the keyword-based estimates. Production AI also reduces price dispersion, though to a lesser extent, reflecting gains in cost efficiency rather than improved market targeting.

Panel B presents results for quantity dispersion. Sales AI significantly increases quantity dispersion, indicating better reallocation of output across markets with heterogeneous demand. Production AI, on the other hand, has no meaningful effect, with estimated coefficients close to zero and statistically insignificant.

Placebo Test. To ensure that our main results are not driven by spurious patterns in the data, we conduct a placebo test by randomly reassigning the treatment variable—defined as the intensity of exposure to AI adoption—across observations. We repeat this process 500 times, constructing a new regression each time using the reshuffled treatment variable. Figure A.7 plots the resulting distribution of coefficients. Panel A shows the placebo estimates based on variation across transactions, while Panel B uses variation across destinations. In both cases, the estimated coefficients are tightly centered around zero, indicating no systematic effect from the randomly assigned treatment. By contrast, the coefficient from our

²³We classify a job as sales-related if it falls under SOC codes “11-2011,” “11-2021,” “13-1161,” or any “41-” series occupation, and as production-related if it falls under “43-5061” or any “51-” series occupation.

baseline specification—shown as the vertical dashed line—lies far outside the placebo distribution. This stark difference confirms that the estimated effect in our main analysis is not an artifact of chance or sample structure, but it reflects a meaningful underlying relationship.

7 Conclusion

This paper develops and tests a theoretical framework in which artificial intelligence mitigates information frictions that hinder firms’ ability to tailor production and pricing decisions to heterogeneous market demand. By introducing AI into a model of monopolistic competition with asymmetric information on consumer tastes, we show that firms adopting AI are better equipped to match supply with demand across destinations, resulting in more uniform prices, greater dispersion in quantities, and enhanced allocative efficiency. Empirically, we confirm these predictions using firm-level export data linked to AI-related job postings.

Our findings emphasize the value of predictive analytics not just for firm performance, but also for aggregate outcomes such as price stability and consumer welfare. Importantly, the technology exerts a powerful selection effect: firms that adopt AI tend to be larger, of higher quality, and more likely to engage in exporting, reinforcing scale advantages in global markets. These results suggest that AI serves not merely as a productivity enhancer but also as an information-enabling technology that reshapes the geography of trade.

Finally, the paper anchors the emerging research agenda on AI and international trade envisioned by [Goldfarb et al. \(2019b\)](#). Data-rich “superstar” firms reap the lion’s share of AI’s gains, and we trace those gains from factoryfloor reallocations all the way to a lower aggregate cost of living. By turning a scale-and-knowledge intuition into concrete welfare improvements, the paper opens several avenues for future work—measuring AI’s general-equilibrium effects on trade flows, market entry, and welfare, and giving policymakers a sharper blueprint for navigating the deepening nexus between predictive algorithms and global commerce.

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
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Appendix

Figure A.1: Spatial Distribution of AI-Related University Enrollment Quotas and Firm Hiring Intensity



Note: This figure illustrates the geographic distribution of AI-related university enrollment quotas alongside firm-level AI hiring demand. Green dots denote universities with substantial AI-related enrollment (exceeding 300 students). The shading represents the density of AI-related job vacancies by prefecture, reflecting regional hiring intensity. The spatial overlap between university talent supply (green dots) and firm demand (shaded regions) suggests a strong correlation between the localization of AI education and labor market needs.

Table A.1: Keywords for Identifying AI and Data Vacancy

<i>Panel A: AI-Related Keywords</i>			<i>Panel B: Data-Related Keywords</i>		
Keywords Index	Chinese	English	Keywords Index	Chinese	English
1	人工智能 机器智能 虚拟智能 模拟智能	artificial intelligence	1	数据分析 数据透视 分析数据 透视数据	data analysis data analytics
2	自动化 自动技术	automation	2	数据建模 数据模型	data modeling
3	机器学习	machine learning	3	数据工程	data engineering
4	深度学习	deep learning	4	数据可视	data visualization
5	人工超级智能 人工超智能 虚拟超级智能 虚拟超智能 模拟超级智能 模拟超智能	artificial superintelligence	5	数据提取 提取数据 信息提取 提取信息 数据获取 获取数据	extract data
6	张量流	tensorflow	6	数据科学	data science
7	自然语言处理	natural language processing	7	商务智能 商业智能	power bi powerbi
8	决策树	decision tree	8	电子表格	spreadsheet
9	贝叶斯	bayes	9	数据仓库	etl
10	神经网络	neural networks	10	数据管理 管理数据	data management
11	监督算法 监督学习	supervised algorithm supervised learning	11	数据挖掘 信息挖掘 挖掘数据 挖掘信息	data mining
12	分布式计算 并行式计算 并行计算	mapreduce	12	预测分析 商业分析	predictive analysis
13	机器数据引擎 机器数据的引擎	splunk	13	预测技术 预测模型 预测建模 预测模式	predictive model
14	聚类分析	cluster analysis	14	数智化 报表分析	tebleau
15	支持向量 向量机	support vector svm	15	表格分析 数据转换 转换数据 数据变换 变换数据	convert data
16	阿帕奇 阿帕切	apache	16	数据下载 下载数据 加载数据 数据加载	download data
17	计算引擎	hadoop	17	数据库 结构化查询语言 结构查询语言 数据查询语言	sql
18		spark	18	分布式存储 分布式文件存储 分布式储存 分布式文件储存	mongodb
19		kubernetes			
20		k8s			
21	大查询 云端存储 云端储存 云端资料分析	bigquery			
22	语言模型 语言模组 语言模式	language mode			
23	计算机视觉 机械视觉 机器视觉	computer vision			
24	扩散模型 扩散模式 传播模型	diffusion model			

Note: This table lists the keywords used to identify whether a job posting is related to AI or data-related technologies. In our implementation, we apply both the English keywords and their corresponding Chinese translations.

Table A.2: Industry Categories Used in the Study

Index	Industry
1	Transportation, storage and postal services
2	Accommodation and catering
3	Information transmission, software and information technology services
4	Public administration, social security and social organizations
5	Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery
6	Manufacturing
7	Health and social work
8	International organization
9	Residential services, repair and other services
10	Construction
11	Real estate
12	Wholesale and retail
13	Education
14	Culture, sports and entertainment
15	Water conservancy, environment and public facilities management
16	Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply
17	Scientific research and technology services
18	Leasing and business services
19	Mining
20	Finance

Note: The listed industries correspond to the 20 top-level sections in the Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities (GB/T 4754-2017) published by the Standardization Administration of China. Lower-tier codes—division (2-digit), group(3-digit), and class (4-digit)—are aggregated to the section level in this study.

A Data Representativeness

We provide a comprehensive discussion of the representativeness of our data by comparing it with other representative data, pointing out potential limitations, and summarizing the nature of our data and its implications.

Comparison with administrative data. We compare key job characteristics—wages, required work experience, and the share of positions requiring a college degree—to national averages derived from administrative records. Table A.3 presents these comparisons, using data from the 2014–2016 OJV sample alongside national statistics from the China Statistical Yearbook and Population Census. Consistent with findings in the literature on OJV data (Kuhn and Shen, 2013; Deming and Kahn, 2018; Kahn and Hershbein, 2018; Acemoglu et al., 2022), our sample skews toward high-skilled, higher-paid jobs, with offered wages approximately 30% higher and the share of position requiring a college degree doubled that of the administrative statistics. This aligns with the nature of online job postings, which tend to capture demand for skilled labor in high-tech and emerging sectors more effectively than traditional administrative records. In particular, He et al. (2025) document the prevalence of gig, skilled work in Chinese OJV data, driven by the development of internet platforms.

Table A.3: Job characteristics: our Samples vs. administrative data

Variables	(1) All OJV	(2) Matched 14-16	(3) Matched 14-15	(4) Baseline	(5) Administrative
Offered Wage (10,000 RMB per year)	10.18 (5.591)	10.21 (5.519)	10.22 (5.526)	10.30 (5.560)	6.75
Working Experience (year)	2.121 (2.192)	2.385 (2.236)	2.348 (2.229)	2.355 (2.236)	—
Share of college degree (%)	70.6% (0.455)	73.2% (0.443)	72.8% (0.445)	72.7% (0.446)	32.23%


Note: Columns (1)–(4) report statistics for different subsamples: (1) the full OJV dataset, (2) a matched sample including only firms engaged in trade between 2014 and 2016, (3) a subset with additional trade quantity and price information (2014–2015), and (4) the sample used in our baseline model. Column (5) presents administrative statistics for the broader labor market in 2016. The Administrative data in column (5) are sourced from the China Statistical Yearbook (2017), which reports the average wage level of 2016, and Population Census (2015), which documents the urban employed population with some college education.

Despite this skewness, these data characteristics are advantageous for our study, as AI skill adoption is more prevalent in high-wage, high-tech sectors and among firms engaged in international trade. The overrepresentation of such industries aligns with the nature of AI diffusion, which tends to occur first in technologically advanced and knowledge-intensive

sectors. Moreover, exporting firms—often larger, more productive, and globally competitive—are more likely to invest in AI-driven innovations to enhance efficiency and maintain a competitive edge in international markets.

Figure A.2 compares the industrial distribution of job vacancies from 2014–2016 with the realized urban employment from administrative records. Our dataset provides a strong representation of the three largest industries—manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and construction—while exhibiting a bias toward high-tech and business-related sectors. Consistent with prior research on OJV data, our sample overrepresents industries such as ICT, finance, scientific research, and leasing and business services, where demand for skilled labor and AI-related technologies is more pronounced. In contrast, industries such as public administration, mining, health and social care, and education are underrepresented, reflecting the limited reliance on OJV platforms for recruitment in these sectors. This sectoral composition aligns well with our research focus. AI adoption is more likely to emerge in technology-intensive, service-oriented, and internationally competitive industries, where firms have both the incentive and capacity to integrate AI-driven innovations.

Figure A.2: Industry distribution of OJV




Note: Authors' calculation based on sampled job vacancies during 2014-2016. Red bars indicate the shares of urban employment by industry documented in the Population Census (2015).

We match our data to the O*NET occupation classification to check the occupational composition of OJV data. Figure A.3 presents the occupational distribution of all job vacancies in our dataset, compared to a matched subset of firms engaged in trade. The distribution

highlights a strong presence of business-related and high-skilled occupations, with a notable concentration in office and administrative support, business and financial operations, sales, and computer and mathematical roles. These occupations align well with our research focus, as AI adoption is more likely to reshape tasks in knowledge-intensive and data-driven professions.

Figure A.3: Occupational distribution of OJV



Note: Authors' calculation based on sampled job vacancies during 2014-2016. Blue bars indicate the whole OJV sample and red bars indicate the subset of firms engaged in trade. The occupation classification is based on O*NET's *job family* categories. The Management category is excluded to improve comparability across non-managerial occupations, given its broad and heterogeneous definition in Chinese job titles.

Notably, computer and mathematical occupations are well represented, which is critical for studying AI skill adoption, as these fields are at the forefront of AI development and implementation. Additionally, sales, financial operations, and administrative support roles play an essential role in firms' export behaviors, particularly in managing trade logistics, market expansion, and customer relationship management. The prevalence of these occupations in our dataset enhances its suitability for examining AI's impact on firms operating in international markets.

From an export perspective, the dataset remains highly relevant, as many of the represented occupations are critical to firms' global competitiveness. AI-related transformations in administrative support, finance, and sales functions could directly influence firms' ability to manage trade relationships, optimize supply chains, and scale operations in international

markets. The high representation of computer and mathematical occupations further enhances the suitability of our data, as these roles are at the frontier of AI adoption.

Limitation. While the OJV data provide broad coverage and granular insights into job vacancies, we acknowledge certain limitations regarding their representativeness of the overall labor market, which warrant some caution in interpreting our findings. First, consistent with prior studies, online job postings tend to overrepresent high-skilled, high-wage jobs, disproportionately favoring educated workers and industries at the technological frontier, such as ICT, finance, and business services. Traditional sectors, including public administration, education, health care, and low-tech manufacturing, are underrepresented, limiting our ability to generalize findings to these segments of the labor market. Second, occupational representation is also skewed, with a concentration in business-related, administrative, and technical roles, while sectors that traditionally rely on lower-skilled employment—such as construction, food services, and manual labor—are less visible in the dataset. Third, strategic hiring practices may introduce selection bias, as firms may not post all job openings online. If firms selectively advertise certain job types online, our results may reflect differential hiring behaviors rather than underlying changes in labor demand.

Summary. Online data and web-based surveys share a natural limitation that the offline segment of information often falls out of the sample (Štefánik, 2012; Steinmetz et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2014). Specifically, the unobservable population and structure of job vacancies make it challenging to address representativeness issues of OJV data (Kureková et al., 2015). As highlighted in the relevant literature and shown in this section, OJV data is likely to represent a segment of the labor market with higher skill levels and in emerging sectors.

Despite these caveats, OJV data remains one of the best available sources for studying the intersection of AI adoption, skill demand, and firm-level trade behavior in China. AI-driven technological change and export-oriented firms are heavily concentrated in industries where online recruitment is a primary hiring channel, making this dataset well-suited for examining how firms adjust their workforce in response to AI adoption and global trade pressures. While challenges related to representativeness persist, we mitigate these concerns through robustness checks, including excluding specific regions and using alternative measures, to validate our results. By leveraging OJV data, which disproportionately captures job postings from firms at the frontier of technological adoption, our study can more effectively analyze the demand for AI-related skills and the impact of AI technology on firms’ employment structures and export behaviors.

B Model Appendix

B.1 The Autarchy Case without AI

B.1.1 Firms' Pricing Decision

After production, each firm chooses its price to maximize profits:

$$\max_p p \min \left\{ q, \frac{z^{\sigma-1} s^{\sigma-1} p^{-\sigma}}{P^{1-\sigma}} \right\}$$

There are two possible cases. If $p \geq (zsP)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} q^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$, then demand is less than capacity. In this condition, lowering the price increases sales and thus raises profits. If $p \leq (zsP)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} q^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$, then production capacity is binding. In this case, raising the price while selling the same fixed quantity increases profits. Putting the two cases together, the firm's optimal price is given by the cutoff value: $p = (zsP)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} q^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$.

B.1.2 Firms' Quantity Decision

Having solved for the optimal price in the third sub-period, we now move backward to the firm's quantity choice. Substituting the optimal price, along with the variable cost, into the firm's profit function yields the following problem:

$$\max_q \mathbb{E}_z((zsP)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} q^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - s^\alpha)q - f.$$

Taking the first-order condition with respect to q and solving gives the optimal output as a function of s :

$$q(s) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}) \right]^\sigma.$$

B.1.3 Firms' Entry Decision

Along the equilibrium path, firms set their price as

$$p(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} s^\alpha.$$

The resulting *ex post* profit (net of the entry cost) is given by

$$\pi(s, z) = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} - 1 \right) \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - f.$$

Taking expectations over z , the expected profit for a firm with quality s is

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z)) = \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^\sigma \left[(\sigma-1)s^{1-\alpha}P \right]^{\sigma-1} - f.$$

The cutoff s_p is defined by the zero-profit condition, so that a firm produces if and only if its quality index exceeds s_p :

$$s_p = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}}{((\sigma-1)P)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}.$$

Expected profits can then be expressed in terms of this cutoff:

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z)) = \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f.$$

Finally, the free-entry condition requires that the expected gains from entry equal the entry cost f_e :

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} (\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z))) dF(s) = f_e,$$

or equivalently,

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) = f_e.$$

This condition uniquely determines the cutoff s_p , which characterizes the minimum quality level required for firms to profitably produce.

B.1.4 Equilibrium

In equilibrium, the labor market clearing condition requires that the total demand for labor equals the available supply. This condition can be written as

$$N_e \left[\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} (q(s)s^\alpha + f) dF(s) + f_e \right] = 1$$

where N_e denotes the number of entrants. Using the relationship $q(s)s^\alpha = (\sigma-1)(\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z)) + f)$, we can express labor demand as

$$N_e \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f dF(s) + N_e f_e = 1.$$

Combining this with the free-entry condition, the equilibrium number of entrants satisfies

$$N_e \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\sigma \left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} \right] f dF(s) = 1.$$

Hence, the equilibrium mass of entrants is given by

$$N_e = \frac{1}{\sigma f \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s)}.$$

Finally, using the zero-profit condition at the cutoff s_p , the equilibrium price index can be written as

$$P = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1)s_p^{1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

Together, these conditions characterize the equilibrium of the economy.

Definition 1 (Equilibrium without AI) *Given $\{F(s), G(z), \sigma, f, f_e\}$, an equilibrium consists of $\{q(s), p(s, z), s_p, N_e, P\}$ such that*

- (1) *customers maximize their utility;*
- (2) *firms maximize their (expected) profit, which implies $p(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} s^\alpha$ and $q(s) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} - \alpha} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_z (z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}) \right]^\sigma$;*
- (3) *zero expected profit (excluding entry cost) at the cutoff*

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s_p, z)) = 0;$$

- (4) *free entry condition is satisfied*

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} (\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z))) dF(s) = f_e;$$

- (5) *goods market clears;*
- (6) *labor market clears*

$$N_e \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f dF(s) + N_e f_e = 1;$$

(7) price index is given by

$$P = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1)s_p^{1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

B.1.5 Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium

The solution to consumers' utility maximization problem is given by the demand function. Firms' profit maximization problem is solved jointly by their pricing decision $p(s, z)$, quantity decision $q(s)$, and production decision, i.e., the cutoff strategy s_p with zero expected profit at the cutoff. Note that the price set by the firm exactly clears the goods market.

We then first show that there exists a unique s_p that satisfies the free entry condition. Note that

$$h(s_p) \equiv \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s)$$

is a continuous function of s_p on the domain of $(0, +\infty)$ and is strictly decreasing in s_p . What's more, $\lim_{s_p \rightarrow 0} h(s_p) = +\infty$ and $\lim_{s_p \rightarrow \infty} h(s_p) = 0$. We can then conclude that there exists a unique $s_p > 0$ that satisfies the free entry condition $\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} (\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z))) dF(s) = f_e$. The price index implies that zero expected profit condition at the cutoff satisfies. Finally, the number of entrants is given by the labor market clear condition

$$N_e = \frac{1}{\sigma f \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s)},$$

as we have solved for s_p .

To complete the proof for the existence of the equilibrium, we need to verify that the price index given by the zero expected profit condition is exactly what consumers face from

the demand side. To see this, we derive

$$\begin{aligned}
P &= \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega} \left(\frac{p(\omega)}{z(\omega)s(\omega)} \right)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \left[N_e \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{p(s, z)}{zs} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \left[N_e \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)} s^{\alpha-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{1}{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)} \left[N_e \mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{1}{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) s_p^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}{\sigma f} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1)s_p^{1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.
\end{aligned}$$

This is exactly what we define as the price index. We complete the proof of the existence of the equilibrium. What's more, as the solution for s_p is unique, the uniqueness of the equilibrium thus follows. Now we finish the proof for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium under asymmetric information.

B.2 The Autarchy Case with AI

B.2.1 Firms' AI Deployment Decision

Without AI, the expected profit of a firm before knowing consumers' taste is

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|n)) = \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\sigma} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - f.$$

On the other hand, the expected profit after AI use is

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|a)) = \frac{\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1})}{\sigma^{\sigma}} \left[(\sigma-1)s^{1-\alpha}P \right]^{\sigma-1} - f - f_{AI}.$$

Therefore, the firm would choose to adopt AI if and only if

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|a)) \geq \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|n))$$

i.e.,

$$s \geq \left[\frac{\sigma^\sigma f_{AI}}{[(\sigma-1)P]^{\sigma-1} \left(\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1}) - \mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^\sigma \right)} \right]^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}.$$

Note that from Jensen's inequality, we know $\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1}) - \mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^\sigma \geq 0$ since $\sigma > 1$. Also, the equality will not hold as the support of $G(z)$ is on the interval $[z_l, z_h]$. Thus, the right hand side of the above equation is larger than zero. We conclude that firms would adopt a

$$\text{cutoff strategy for AI use with } s_a^{AI} = \left[\frac{\sigma^\sigma f_{AI}}{[(\sigma-1)P]^{\sigma-1} \left(\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1}) - \mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^\sigma \right)} \right]^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}.$$

B.2.2 Threshold Comparison

Comparing s_a^{AI} with $s_p^{AI} = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}}{((\sigma-1)P)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}$, we have

$$s_a^{AI} = s_p^{AI} \left(\frac{f_{AI} \left[\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right]^\sigma}{f \left(\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1}) - \left[\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right]^\sigma \right)} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}} > s_p^{AI}$$

by Assumption 2, i.e., the cutoff for using AI is higher than that for production.

B.2.3 Equilibrium

From the zero expected profit condition at the production cutoff and indifference condition at the AI cutoff, the expected profit for firms with quality $s \in (s_p^{AI}, s_a^{AI})$ can be written as

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|n)) = \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f,$$

and that for firms with quality $s \in [s_a^{AI}, +\infty)$ can be written as

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|a)) = \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f + \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI}.$$

From free entry condition, we have

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\pi^{AI}(s, z) \right) dF(s) = f_e,$$

i.e.,

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) = f_e.$$

With the relationship between s_p^{AI} and s_a^{AI} , we can solve for s_p^{AI} and s_a^{AI} from the equations. Note that s_a^{AI} increases with s_p^{AI} .

We now define the equilibrium with access to AI technology.

Definition 2 (Equilibrium with AI) *Given $\{F(s), G(z), \sigma, f, f_e\}$, an equilibrium consists of $\{q^{AI}(s, z), p^{AI}(s, z), s_p^{AI}, s_a^{AI}, N_e^{AI}, P\}$ such that*

(1) *customers maximize their utility;*

(2) *firms maximize their (expected) profit, which implies $p^{AI}(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} s^\alpha$ and $q^{AI}(s, z) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} - \alpha} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma z^{\sigma-1}$ for firms with $s \in [s_a^{AI}, +\infty)$, and $p^{AI}(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} s^\alpha$ and $q^{AI}(s) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} - \alpha} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}) \right]^\sigma$ for firms with $s \in [s_p^{AI}, s_a^{AI})$;*

(3) *zero expected profit (excluding entry cost) at the cutoff*

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s_p^{AI}, z|n)) = 0;$$

(4) *indifference about the expected profit between using AI and not using at the AI cutoff*

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s_a^{AI}, z|n)) = \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s_a^{AI}, z|a));$$

(5) *free entry condition is satisfied*

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z)) dF(s) = f_e;$$

(6) *goods market clears;*

(7) *labor market clears*

$$N_e^{AI} \left\{ \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) + f_e \right\} = 1;$$

(8) price index is given by

$$P^{AI} = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1)s_p^{AI \cdot 1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

B.2.4 Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium

The solution to consumers' utility maximization problem is given by the demand function. Firms' profit maximization problem is solved jointly by their pricing decision $p^{AI}(s, z)$, quantity decision $q^{AI}(s, z)$, and production decision and AI adoption decision, i.e., the cutoff strategy s_p^{AI} with zero expected profit at the cutoff and s_a^{AI} with indifferent expected profit at the cutoff. Note that the price set by the firm exactly clears the goods market.

We then first show that there exists a unique set of s_p^{AI} and s_a^{AI} that satisfies the free entry condition. By defining $C \equiv \left(\frac{f_{AI} [\mathbb{E}_z (z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})]^\sigma}{f (\mathbb{E}_z (z^{\sigma-1}) - [\mathbb{E}_z (z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})]^\sigma)} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}$, which is a constant, we have $s_a^{AI} = C \cdot s_p^{AI}$ from the condition of indifference about the expected profits between using AI and not using at the AI cutoff. Note that

$$h(s_p^{AI}) \equiv \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{Cs_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{Cs_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s)$$

is a continuous function of s_p^{AI} on the domain of $(0, +\infty)$ and is strictly decreasing in s_p^{AI} . What's more, $\lim_{s_p^{AI} \rightarrow 0} h(s_p^{AI}) = +\infty$ and $\lim_{s_p^{AI} \rightarrow \infty} h(s_p^{AI}) = 0$. We can then conclude that there exists a unique $s_p^{AI} > 0$ that satisfies the free entry condition $\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z (\pi^{AI}(s, z)) dF(s) = f_e$. Then s_a^{AI} is also uniquely determined. The price index implies that zero expected profit condition at the cutoff satisfies. Finally, the number of entrants is given by the labor market clear condition

$$N_e^{AI} = \frac{1}{\sigma \left[f \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + f_{AI} \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) \right]},$$

as we have solved for s_p^{AI} and s_a^{AI} .

To complete the proof for the existence of the equilibrium, we need to verify that the price index given by the zero expected profit condition is exactly what consumers face from

the demand side. To see this, we derive

$$\begin{aligned}
P &= \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega} \left(\frac{p(\omega)}{z(\omega)s(\omega)} \right)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \left[N_e^{AI} \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{p(s, z)}{zs} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \left[N_e^{AI} \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{s_a^{AI}} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)} s^{\alpha-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) + N_e^{AI} \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} z^{-1} s^{\alpha-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= N_e^{AI} \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left[\left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{s_a^{AI}} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + \mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1} \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= N_e^{AI} \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left[\left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + \left[\mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1} - \left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \right] \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left[N_e^{AI} \left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \left(\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + \frac{f_{AI}}{f} \left(\frac{s_p^{AI}}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left[\left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \frac{s_p^{AI (\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}{\sigma f} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1) s_p^{AI 1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.
\end{aligned}$$

This is exactly what we define as the price index. We complete the proof of the existence of the equilibrium. What's more, as the solutions for s_p^{AI} and s_a^{AI} are unique, the uniqueness of the equilibrium thus follows. Now we finish the proof for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with AI.

B.2.5 Proof of Proposition 1

Note that s_p satisfies

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) = f_e$$

and s_p^{AI} satisfies

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{C s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{C s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) = f_e.$$

As $\int_{Cs_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{Cs_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) > 0$, we have

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) < \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s).$$

Since $h(s_p) \equiv \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s)$ strictly decreases in s_p , we have $s_p^{AI} > s_p$.

B.3 Open Economy Case with AI

B.3.1 Firms' Export Decision and the Sorting Pattern

For firms that do not adopt AI and serve only the domestic market, the expected profit is analogous to (2):

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|n)) = \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z\left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)}{\sigma} \right]^\sigma [(\sigma-1)s^{1-\alpha}P]^{\sigma-1} - f.$$

On the other hand, for firms that adopt AI while serving the domestic market only, the expected profit is given by:

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|a)) = \frac{\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\sigma-1})}{\sigma^\sigma} [(\sigma-1)s^{1-\alpha}P]^{\sigma-1} - f - f_{AI}.$$

For exporters employing AI

$$q_e^{AI}(s, z_d|e) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\tau\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha} (z_d P)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma$$

for each foreign market with consumer preference parameter z_d and the corresponding price is

$$p_e^{AI}(s, z_d|e) = \frac{\tau\sigma}{\sigma-1} s^\alpha.$$

The expected profit (excluding entry cost) is

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|e)) = (1 + n\tau^{1-\sigma}) \frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1}}{\sigma^\sigma} [(\sigma-1)s^{1-\alpha}P]^{\sigma-1} - f - f_{AI} - nf_{exp}.$$

Firms will choose to export if and only if

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|e)) \geq \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|a)),$$

which gives us the export cutoff s_e^{AI} as

$$s_e^{AI} = \left[\frac{\tau f_{exp}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \sigma^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1)P(\mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} = \tau^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} s_p^{AI} \left(\frac{f_{exp} [\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}]^\sigma}{f [\mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1}]} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}.$$

By Assumption 3, $s_e^{AI} > s_a^{AI}$. Note that if a firm chooses to export but to not use AI, the gain from exporting would be smaller. Thus, the cutoff for exporting would be even higher, which implies this type of firms won't exist in equilibrium. We then obtain the sorting pattern as $s_p^{AI} < s_a^{AI} < s_e^{AI}$.

B.3.2 Equilibrium

From the zero expected profit condition at the production cutoff and indifference conditions at the AI cutoff and export cutoff, the expected profit for firms with quality $s \in (s_p^{AI}, s_a^{AI})$ can be written as

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|n)) = \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f,$$

that for firms with quality $s \in [s_a^{AI}, s_e^{AI})$ can be written as

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|a)) = \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f + \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI},$$

and that for firms with quality $s \in [s_e^{AI}, s_e^{AI})$ can be written as

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z|e)) = \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f + \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} + n \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp}.$$

From free entry condition, we have

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z)) dF(s) = f_e,$$

i.e.,

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) + n \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) = f_e.$$

With the relationship between s_p^{AI} , s_a^{AI} and s_e^{AI} , we can solve for s_p^{AI} , s_a^{AI} and s_e^{AI} from the equations. Note that s_a^{AI} and s_e^{AI} increase with s_p^{AI} .

We now define the equilibrium with access to AI technology in the open economy.

Definition 3 (Equilibrium with AI under Free Trade) Given $\{F(s), G(z), \sigma, f, f_x, \tau\}$, an equilibrium consists of $\{q^{AI}(s, z), p^{AI}(s, z), q_e^{AI}(s, z), p_e^{AI}(s, z), s_p^{AI}, s_a^{AI}, s_e^{AI}, N_e^{AI}, P^{AI}\}$ such that

- (1) customers maximize their utility;
- (2) firms maximize their (expected) profit, which implies $p_e^{AI}(s, z_d) = \frac{\tau\sigma}{\sigma-1}s^\alpha$ and $q_e^{AI}(s, z_d) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\tau\sigma}s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha}P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^\sigma z_d^{\sigma-1}$ in the foreign market, and $p^{AI}(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}s^\alpha$ and $q^{AI}(s, z) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha}P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^\sigma z^{\sigma-1}$ in the domestic market for firms with $s \in [s_e^{AI}, +\infty)$, $p^{AI}(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}s^\alpha$ and $q^{AI}(s, z) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha}P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^\sigma z^{\sigma-1}$ in the domestic market for firms with $s \in [s_a^{AI}, s_e^{AI})$, and $p^{AI}(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} s^\alpha$ and $q^{AI}(s) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha}P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})\right]^\sigma$ for firms with $s \in [s_p^{AI}, s_a^{AI})$;
- (3) zero expected profit (excluding entry cost) at the production cutoff

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s_p^{AI}, z|n)) = 0;$$

- (4) indifference about the expected profit between using AI and not using at the AI cutoff

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s_a^{AI}, z|n)) = \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s_a^{AI}, z|a));$$

- (5) indifference about the expected profit between exporting and not exporting at the export cutoff

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s_e^{AI}, z|a)) = \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s_e^{AI}, z|e));$$

- (6) free entry condition is satisfied

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z))dF(s) = f_e;$$

- (7) goods market clears;

- (8) labor market clears

$$N_e^{AI} \left\{ \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) + n \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) + f_e \right\} = 1;$$

- (9) price index is given by

$$P^{AI} = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1)s_p^{AI \ 1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

B.3.3 Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium

The solution to consumers' utility maximization problem is given by the demand function. Firms' profit maximization problem is solved jointly by their pricing decision $p^{AI}(s, z)$, quantity decision $q^{AI}(s, z)$, and production decision, AI adoption decision, and export decision, i.e., the cutoff strategy s_p^{AI} with zero expected profit at the cutoff, s_a^{AI} with indifferent expected profit at the cutoff and s_e^{AI} with indifferent expected profit at the cutoff. Note that the price set by the firm exactly clears the goods market.

We then first show that there exists a unique set of s_p^{AI} , s_a^{AI} and s_e^{AI} that satisfies the free entry condition. By defining $C_1 \equiv \left(\frac{f_{AI} \left[\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right]^\sigma}{f \left(\mathbb{E}_z (z^{\sigma-1}) - \left[\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right]^\sigma \right)} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}$ and $C_2 \equiv \tau^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{f_{exp} \left[\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma}{f \left[\mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1} \right]} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}$, which are two constants, we have $s_a^{AI} = C_1 \cdot s_p^{AI}$ and $s_e^{AI} = C_2 \cdot s_p^{AI}$ from the conditions of indifference about the expected profits between using AI and not using at the AI cutoff, and between exporting and not exporting at the export cutoff. Note that

$$h(s_p^{AI}) \equiv \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{C_1 s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{C_1 s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) + n \int_{C_2 s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{C_2 s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s)$$

is a continuous function of s_p^{AI} on the domain of $(0, +\infty)$ and is strictly decreasing in s_p^{AI} . What's more, $\lim_{s_p^{AI} \rightarrow 0} h(s_p^{AI}) = +\infty$ and $\lim_{s_p^{AI} \rightarrow \infty} h(s_p^{AI}) = 0$. We can then conclude that there exists a unique $s_p^{AI} > 0$ that satisfies the free entry condition $\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z(\pi^{AI}(s, z)) dF(s) = f_e$. Then s_a^{AI} and s_e^{AI} are also uniquely determined. The price index implies that zero expected profit condition at the cutoff satisfies. Finally, the number of entrants is given by the labor market clear condition

$$N_e^{AI} = \frac{1}{\left\{ \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) + n \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma-1) \left(\frac{s}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) + f_e \right\}}$$

as we have solved for s_p^{AI} , s_a^{AI} , and s_e^{AI} .

To complete the proof for the existence of the equilibrium, we need to verify that the price index given by the zero expected profit condition is exactly what consumers face from

the demand side. To see this, we derive

$$\begin{aligned}
P &= \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega} \left(\frac{p(\omega)}{z(\omega)s(\omega)} \right)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \left[N_e^{AI} \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{p(s, z)}{zs} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \left[N_e^{AI} \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{s_a^{AI}} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)} s^{\alpha-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) + N_e^{AI} \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} z^{-1} s^{\alpha-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) + n N_e^{AI} \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z \left(\frac{\tau \sigma}{\sigma-1} z^{-1} s^{\alpha-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= N_e^{AI \frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left[\left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{s_a^{AI}} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + \mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1} \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + n \tau^{1-\sigma} \mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1} \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\alpha-1)(1-\sigma)} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= N_e^{AI \frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left[\left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + \left(\mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1} - \left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \right) \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + n \tau^{1-\sigma} \mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1} \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\alpha-1)(1-\sigma)} dF(s) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left[N_e^{AI} \left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \left(\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + \frac{L_A}{f} \left(\frac{s_p^{AI}}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} dF(s) + \frac{f_{exp}}{f} \left(\frac{s_p^{AI}}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} s^{\sigma-1} (1-\alpha) dF(s) \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left[\left(\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^\sigma \frac{s_p^{AI (\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}{\sigma f} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
&= \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1) s_p^{AI \frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.
\end{aligned}$$

This is exactly what we define as the price index. We complete the proof of the existence of the equilibrium. What's more, as the solutions for s_p^{AI} , s_a^{AI} and s_e^{AI} are unique, the uniqueness of the equilibrium thus follows. Now we finish the proof for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with AI in the open economy.

B.3.4 Benchmark: Open Economy Case without AI

In an open economy without AI, firms would choose between exporting and not exporting. If they do not export, the expected profit (excluding entry cost) for a firm with quality s would be

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z|n)) = \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)}{\sigma} \right]^\sigma \left[(\sigma-1) s^{1-\alpha} P \right]^{\sigma-1} - f.$$

If they export, the quantity produced for each foreign market and the corresponding price would be

$$q_e(s, z_d|e) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\tau \sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_z \left(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right]^\sigma$$

and

$$p_e(s, z_d|e) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{z_d^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} \tau s^\alpha.$$

The expected profit (excluding entry cost) would be

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z|e)) = (1 + n\tau^{1-\sigma}) \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})}{\sigma} \right]^\sigma [(\sigma - 1)s^{1-\alpha}P]^{\sigma-1} - f - nf_{exp}.$$

Firms will choose to export if and only if

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z|e)) \geq \mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z|n)),$$

which gives us the export cutoff s_e as

$$s_e = \left[\frac{\tau f_{exp}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \sigma^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma - 1)P \left[\mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}) \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} = s_p \left[\frac{\tau^{\sigma-1} f_{exp}}{f} \right]^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}.$$

By Assumption 3, $s_e > s_p$.

From free entry condition, we have

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z)) dF(s) = f_e,$$

i.e.,

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + n \int_{s_e}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) = f_e.$$

Definition 4 (Equilibrium without AI under Free Trade) Given $\{F(s), G(z), \sigma, f, f_x, \tau\}$, an equilibrium consists of $\{q(s, z), p(s, z), q_e(s, z), p_e(s, z), s_p, s_e, N_e, P\}$ such that

(1) customers maximize their utility;

(2) firms maximize their (expected) profit, which implies $p_e(s, z_d) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z_d^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} \tau s^\alpha$ and $q_e(s, z_d) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\tau\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}) \right]^\sigma$ for firms with $s \in [s_e, +\infty)$, in the foreign market, and $p(s, z) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}} s^\alpha$ and $q^{AI}(s, z) = \left[\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} s^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-\alpha} P^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \mathbb{E}_z(z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}) \right]^\sigma$ for firms with $s \in [s_p, +\infty)$ in the domestic market;

(3) zero expected profit (excluding entry cost) at the production cutoff

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s_p, z|n)) = 0;$$

(4) indifference about the expected profit between exporting and not exporting at the export cutoff

$$\mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s_e, z|n)) = \mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s_e, z|e));$$

(5) free entry condition is satisfied

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}_z(\pi(s, z)) dF(s) = f_e;$$

(6) goods market clears;

(7) labor market clears

$$N_e \left\{ \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma - 1) \left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f dF(s) + n \int_{s_e}^{+\infty} \left[(\sigma - 1) \left(\frac{s}{s_e} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} + 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) + f_e \right\} = 1;$$

(8) price index is given by

$$P = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma - 1)s_p^{1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium can be proved *a la* the cases above.

B.3.5 Proof of Proposition 2

Note that s_p satisfies

$$\int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + n \int_{s_e}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) = f_e$$

and s_p^{AI} satisfies

$$\int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{s_a^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_a^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) + n \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) = f_e.$$

With the definition of $C_2 \equiv \tau^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{f_{exp} [\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}]^{\sigma}}{f [\mathbb{E}_z z^{\sigma-1}]} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}$ and $C_3 \equiv \left[\frac{\tau^{\sigma-1} f_{exp}}{f} \right]^{\frac{1}{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)}}$,

we have $s_e^{AI} = C_2 s_p^{AI}$ and $s_e = C_3 s_p$. Since $C_2 \leq C_3$, if $s_p \geq s_p^{AI}$, we would have $s_e \geq s_e^{AI}$.

This further implies

$$\begin{aligned}
f_e &= \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{AI} dF(s) + n \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) \\
&> \int_{s_p^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + n \int_{s_e^{AI}}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e^{AI}} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) \\
&\geq \int_{s_p}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_p} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f dF(s) + n \int_{s_e}^{+\infty} \left[\left(\frac{s}{s_e} \right)^{(\sigma-1)(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right] f_{exp} dF(s) \\
&= f_e,
\end{aligned}$$

which is impossible. Hence, we have $s_p < s_p^{AI}$, which is the first part of Proposition 2.

For exporting firms, the expectations of quantity sample variance across foreign markets with and without AI are ²⁴

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}(s^2(q)) &= \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{d=1}^n \left(q_d - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i}{n} \right)^2 \right) \\
&= \frac{n-1}{n} Var(q)
\end{aligned}$$

as random variables q_d are i.i.d in both cases. Without AI, since $q_d = q$, $\forall d$, this equation equals 0, and with AI, this equation is larger than zero. Hence, the quantity sample variance across foreign markets increases in expectation.

Similarly, the expectations of price sample variance across foreign markets with and without AI are

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}(s^2(p)) &= \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{d=1}^n \left(p_d - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i}{n} \right)^2 \right) \\
&= \frac{n-1}{n} Var(p)
\end{aligned}$$

as random variables p_d are i.i.d in both cases. Without AI, this equation is larger than zero, and with AI, since $p_d = p$, $\forall d$, this equation equals 0. Hence, the price sample variance across foreign markets decreases in expectation. We thus arrive at the second part of Proposition 2.

The price index, given by

$$P = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1)s_p^{1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

²⁴Here we define s^2 with the denominator of n rather $n-1$ which is more often used. This constant multiplier would not impact our results at all as long as we use the same definition in both cases.

and

$$P^{AI} = \frac{f^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}{(\sigma-1)s_p^{AI \ 1-\alpha}} \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_z z^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}}{\sigma} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

respectively, becomes smaller with the availability of AI, since $s_p < s_p^{AI}$ as shown above. Thus, we complete the proof of Proposition 2.

C Anecdotal Evidence: Examples of AI adoptions

To provide a clearer picture of how firms apply AI to address information friction in consumer preferences, we present both job-level evidence from our dataset and real-world implementation examples from industry.

Job-level AI adoptions. Figure A.4 shows actual job postings from our sample, where employers explicitly describe AI-related responsibilities. For data mining engineers, key tasks include data-driven prediction and identification of business value. Specific skills like deep learning and large language models are listed in the job requirements. Manufacturing consultants are expected to implement intelligent planning and design AI-driven solutions to optimize production based on real-time market feedback. These postings demonstrate how firms are integrating AI specifically to bridge information gaps between production decisions and consumer preferences.

Business AI applications. Beyond our dataset, we collect actual business cases that illustrate how differentiated AI functions help exporters and multinationals understand markets.²⁵ Figure A.5 presents the news reported by *China Council For the Promotion of International Trade* on AI-driven marketing and intelligent exporting, highlighting the rapid growth of AI-powered business analytics and marketing strategies in China’s foreign trade sector. Compared to its well-documented production-side effects such as automation and cost reduction, AI’s impact on the demand side remains an underexplored dimension. Empirical evidence from industry reports and business case studies reveals that firms integrating

²⁵AI has rapidly transformed sales and marketing practices at prominent companies worldwide. Leading technology firms like Amazon benefit substantially from deploying AI in recommendation engines, supply chain optimization, and sophisticated market analytics (Ruby Engine, 2024; AWS, 2025). Traditional retail and sales firms, such as Zara and Walmart, leverage AI to accurately forecast consumer demand trends, optimize inventory management, and deliver personalized customer experiences (Abdullah, 2025; Walmart Global Tech, 2024). Specialized technology providers offer AI-driven digital transformation solutions, helping other companies integrate AI capabilities such as customer relationship management (CRM), predictive analytics, and automated business processes into their existing operations (See Salesforce for examples).

AI into market forecasting significantly outperform traditional forecasting methods, reducing prediction errors by approximately 20% to 50%, and consequently experiencing 10-15% gains in sales growth, 20-30% reduce in inventory costs, and improved market alignment.²⁶ As illustrated in Figure A.6, business-related adoption of AI can deliver substantial value, particularly in service operations, product development, and sales & marketing, underscoring AI’s demand-side performances. We also showcase various examples of Chinese firms utilizing AI, including software as a service (SaaS), advanced planning and scheduling, and production chain optimizations.


- E.g.1 “Currently, **Bailian Intelligence** has established a comprehensive and mature enterprise database along with an industry knowledge base matrix, demonstrating industry-leading AI application capabilities. Its product portfolio not only includes intelligent customer acquisition SaaS products but also features independently developed AI-driven applications for data security classification and grading, policy interpretation, and official document writing. By advancing in both customer acquisition scenarios and underlying AI technology applications, the company is pursuing a dual-track approach to innovation.”
- E.g.2 “**ZhongAn Technology** leverages artificial intelligence, big data, and cloud computing to drive innovation while integrating the advantages of the ZhongAn ecosystem. Validated through real-world business applications, the company has developed a value delivery system combining technology and services, centered around three standardized technology product series: business growth, business operations, and business infrastructure.”
- E.g.3 “**Midea**’s digital supply chain platform enables real-time production planning for over 6,000 core upstream suppliers. Market order data from various sales channels converge onto Midea’s digital platform, where upstream and downstream enterprises can share end-market demand information in real-time via the cloud. Leveraging the platform’s intelligent scheduling algorithms, suppliers can develop master production plans and refine them into detailed sub-production plans down to individual workstations and equipment. This flexible production approach enhances the responsiveness and coordination across the entire industrial chain, improving order fulfillment rates and better adapting to the increasingly fragmented and dynamic demands of downstream markets.”

²⁶McKinsey Report (2025) and Deloitte Insights (2025) provide comprehensive cross-nation analysis on how AI is reshaping business strategies and value creation. Ozturk (2024) and the article in Global Trade (2024) compiles detailed evidence of AI-powered forecasting and trade performance across regions and sectors, including retail supply chains, food & beverage, fast fashion, and global logistics.


In summary, the real-world cases – from AI-powered personalized recommendations to demand forecasting and marketing – demonstrate how businesses are deploying AI to sharpen their knowledge of consumer preferences. This market-learning function of AI distinguishes it from traditional automation technologies. While production-oriented AI might simply reduce costs uniformly across markets, sales-oriented AI allows firms to tailor their strategies to specific market segments by lowering information frictions. Our theoretical model formalizes how this capability reshapes export behavior and market outcomes.

Figure A.4: Illustrative Examples of AI-related Job Postings

(a) Data Mining Engineer




(b) Manufacturing Consultant



Note: These examples are actual job postings we draw from our sample to illustrate the data source, structure, and AI technology content. Some detailed information is masked on purpose.

Figure A.5: Reports on AI Marketing and Intelligent Exporting



China Trade News: Digital Empowerment and AI Integration—Experiencing the “Tech Vibe” at the CIFTIS


According to reports, this is *Alibaba's* first AI product fully applied to the foreign trade sector since the latest wave of AI advancements. The product covers all aspects of foreign trade operations for domestic SMEs. It includes two main services, "Business Assistant" and "*OKKI AI*," offering a range of features such as intelligent product listing and management, market analysis, customer engagement, real-time video chat translation, and enterprise management.

Moreover, *Alibaba* International's AI product also leverages its market intelligence and analytical capabilities in product management, providing merchants with clear and actionable operational insights for overseas markets.

Yi Dian Tian Xia has introduced *KreadoAI*, its first self-developed AIGC digital marketing creation platform, designed to support Chinese brands in expanding globally through AI-powered marketing services. Built on four core solutions—AI digital humans, AI models, AI tools, and AI creative assets—*KreadoAI* provides multi-scenario AI+ solutions for global users. The technology has been fully integrated into various marketing stages, enhancing efficiency, reducing costs, and improving quality across the entire marketing chain for Chinese brands entering international markets.

Note: Authors' translation of [China Trade Post \(2023\)](#), published by *China Council For the Promotion of International Trade*.

Figure A.6: AI business functions and their value creations



Notes: Authors' calculation based on [McKinsey Global Institute's report](#) on AI adoptions, surveying more than three thousand companies across nations in 2017. Each bar donates the share of companies that self-reported significant value gain from adopting the corresponding AI function. The details of the survey can be found in [Bughin et al. \(2017\)](#).

D Robustness Checks

Table A.4: Robustness Checks: Impact of AI Adoption on Price and Quantity Dispersion

Dep var.	(1) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(2) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(3) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(4) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(5) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(6) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(7) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(8) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$
<i>Panel A: Excluding National Municipalities</i>				<i>Panel B: Winsorizing Extreme Values</i>				
AI_{ift}^S	-2.098*** (0.419)	0.282* (0.146)	-1.726*** (0.414)	0.259* (0.126)	-2.447*** (0.500)	0.252* (0.124)	-2.135*** (0.479)	0.294** (0.137)
Observations	77,756	76,950	73,520	72,798	113,250	111,820	106,510	105,210
Adjusted R^2	0.767	0.899	0.776	0.900	0.781	0.898	0.790	0.900
<i>Panel C: Assigning Zero to Missing Vacancy Values</i>				<i>Panel D: Rescaling Product Shares Relative to Core Product</i>				
AI_{ift}^S	-2.637*** (0.508)	0.258** (0.111)	-2.346*** (0.476)	0.285** (0.112)	-1.016*** (0.213)	0.227*** (0.033)	-0.823*** (0.157)	0.190*** (0.043)
Observations	182,224	179,944	169,948	167,940	114,466	113,018	107,688	106,378
Adjusted R^2	0.780	0.899	0.790	0.902	0.778	0.900	0.788	0.902
<i>Panel E: Using Core Product Dummy</i>								
AI_{ift}^S	-1.379*** (0.390)	0.191** (0.067)	-1.157*** (0.308)	0.180** (0.074)				
Observations	113,250	111,820	106,510	105,210				
Adjusted R^2	0.778	0.900	0.788	0.902				
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>								
Firm-HS 8-digit	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
HS 8-digit-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Panel A excludes firms located in the four municipalities directly administered by the central government of China (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing). Panel B winsorizes extreme values of the AI variable at the top and bottom 1%. Panel C treats missing vacancy postings as zero, assuming that firms did not recruit sales-AI workers in years when they do not appear in the vacancy dataset. Panel D replaces the continuous product share measure with a binary indicator for the core product—defined as the product with the highest export share within each firm-year. Panel E interacts AI adoption with the core product dummy, rather than the continuous share variable. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.5: Robustness Checks: the Distinct Role of Sales AI Versus Other Technologies

Dep var.	(1) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(2) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(3) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(4) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(5) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(6) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(7) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$	(8) $\ln Var(q)_{ift}$
Panel A: Non-Sales AI Effects on Market Dispersion				Panel B: Non-Sales AI on Transaction Dispersion				
AI_{ift}^{NS}	-0.993*** (0.0577)	-0.953*** (0.056)	0.104 (0.107)	0.122 (0.108)	-1.033*** (0.141)	-0.997*** (0.132)	0.149 (0.119)	0.163 (0.118)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$		0.759*** (0.014)		0.413*** (0.019)				
$\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$						0.794*** (0.011)		0.393*** (0.010)
Observations	106,510	106,510	105,210	105,210	113,250	113,250	111,820	111,820
Adjusted R^2	0.788	0.793	0.902	0.903	0.778	0.783	0.900	0.901
Panel C: Combining Sales and Non-Sales AI				Panel D: AI Compared to Other Data Technologies				
AI_{ift}^{Pool}	-2.044*** (0.166)	-2.008*** (0.180)	0.249** (0.112)	0.266** (0.108)	-1.613*** (0.161)	-1.572*** (0.179)	0.234* (0.121)	0.253** (0.117)
$Data_{ift}$					-1.596*** (0.122)	-1.613*** (0.132)	0.0565 (0.057)	0.0496 (0.054)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$		0.758*** (0.014)		0.413*** (0.019)		0.759*** (0.014)		0.413*** (0.019)
Observations	106,510	106,510	105,210	105,210	106,510	106,510	105,210	105,210
Adjusted R^2	0.788	0.793	0.902	0.903	0.789	0.793	0.902	0.903
Panel E: Sales AI with Controls for Other Technologies								
AI_{ift}^S	-2.588*** (0.584)	-2.572*** (0.627)	0.412** (0.172)	0.420** (0.157)				
AI_{ift}^{NS}	-1.414*** (0.106)	-1.368*** (0.121)	0.198 (0.125)	0.219* (0.122)				
$Data_{ift}$	-1.510*** (0.122)	-1.525*** (0.132)	0.041 (0.053)	0.035 (0.051)				
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$		0.759*** (0.014)		0.413*** (0.019)				
Observations	106,510	106,510	105,210	105,210				
Adjusted R^2	0.789	0.793	0.902	0.903				
Fixed Effects:								
Firm-HS 8-digit	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
HS 8-digit-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Panel A reports results on the dispersion of prices and quantities across destinations within a firm-product-year, calculated as the variance in average unit prices and quantities across all destination markets served, as defined in equation (7), using non-sales AI as the independent variable. Panel B measures dispersion across individual transactions within each firm-product-year, based on shipment-level trade flows, including repeated transactions to the same destination, again using non-sales AI as the independent variable. Panel C instead uses overall AI adoption—regardless of application—as the independent variable. Panel D adds general data technology adoption as an additional independent variable. Panel E includes all three measures—sales AI, non-sales AI, and general data technology—simultaneously in the regression. $\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$ and $\ln(\# \text{ of Transactions})_{ift}$ denote the log number of destinations and total transactions, respectively, for firm f selling product i in year t . Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.6: Robustness Checks: Identifying Sales AI Adoption via Occupation-used Vacancies

Dep var.	(1) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(2) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(3) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$	(4) $\ln Var(p)_{ift}$
<i>Panel A: Price Dispersion Across Destinations</i>				
AI_{ift}^S	-2.018*** (0.377)	-2.007*** (0.396)		
AI_{ift}^{NS}			-1.819*** (0.186)	-1.831*** (0.195)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$		0.765*** (0.015)		0.765*** (0.015)
Observations	105,602	105,602	105,602	105,602
Adjusted R^2	0.789	0.793	0.789	0.793
<i>Panel B: Quantity Dispersion Across Destinations</i>				
AI_{ift}^S	0.133** (0.046)	0.136*** (0.044)		
AI_{ift}^{NS}			0.0268 (0.118)	0.0202 (0.117)
$\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$		0.412*** (0.020)		0.412*** (0.020)
Observations	104,302	104,302	104,302	104,302
Adjusted R^2	0.902	0.903	0.902	0.903
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>				
Firm-HS 8-digit	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y
HS 8-digit-Year	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Panel A reports results for price dispersion, calculated as the variance in average unit prices across all destination markets served by a firm-product-year, following equation (7). Panel B reports results for quantity dispersion, calculated analogously as the variance in quantities sold across destinations. In both panels, AI adoption is classified based on SOC occupational codes. $\ln(\# \text{ of Destinations})_{ift}$ denotes the logarithm of the number of destinations for firm f selling product i in year t . Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.1 Robustness Checks: AI Adoption and Firm Productivity

Estimating Firm Productivity. We estimate productivity by specifying the following production function. Let y_{it} denote the logarithm of output for firm i in year t , and assume the production function takes the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{it} &= \beta_0 + \beta_l l_{it} + \beta_k k_{it} + \omega_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \\ &= \beta_l l_{it} + \phi(k_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

where k_{it} and l_{it} denote the logarithms of capital and labor inputs, respectively, and $\phi(k_{it}) = \beta_0 + \beta_k k_{it} + \omega(k_{it})$ captures the flexible component of the production function. The term ω_{it} represents firm-specific productivity, which is the object of interest. To estimate it, we approximate $\phi(k_{it})$ using a third-order polynomial in k_{it} and obtain a consistent estimate of the output elasticity of labor, $\hat{\beta}_l$, by estimating the following OLS regression:

$$y_{it} = \delta_0 + \beta_l l_{it} + \sum_{j=1}^3 \delta_j k_{it}^j + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

We can thus obtain the consistent estimate of ϕ_{it} and $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}$, which is given by

$$\hat{\phi}_{it} = \hat{y}_{it} - \hat{\beta}_l l_{it} = \hat{\delta}_0 + \sum_{j=1}^3 \hat{\delta}_j k_{it}^j.$$

Then we estimate β_0 and β_k using the GMM method. Specifically, for each set of candidate values of β_0^* and β_k^* , we compute the prediction for ω_{it} as $\hat{\omega}_{it} = \hat{\phi}_{it} - \beta_0^* - \beta_k^* k_{it}$. Assume the motion of ω satisfies $\omega_{it} = \gamma_1 \omega_{it-1} + e_{it}$. Then by regressing ω_{it} on ω_{it-1} , we could obtain the estimation for $\mathbb{E}(\omega_{it} | \omega_{it-1}) = \hat{\gamma}_1 \omega_{it-1}$ and also the estimation for e_{it} . We then make use of the moment condition $\mathbb{E}((\varepsilon_{it} + e_{it}) | i_{it}) = 0$, where i_{it} is the investment of firm i in year t , and search for β_0 and β_k to minimize $(\hat{\varepsilon}_{it} + \hat{e}_{it}) i_{it}$.

As a robustness check, we also construct the moment condition using information on intermediate inputs, imposing $\mathbb{E}[(\varepsilon_{it} + e_{it}) | m_{it}] = 0$, where m_{it} denotes the logarithm of intermediate input usage. We then estimate the parameters β_0 and β_k accordingly. Based on these estimates, firm-level productivity is inferred as the residual. To mitigate the influence of outliers, we trim the estimated productivity distribution by 1% at both tails. Columns (1)–(3) of Table A.7 report results using the moment condition based on intermediate inputs, while Columns (4)–(6) present results using the investment-based moment condition.

Impact of AI Use On Firm Productivity. Column (1) uses overall AI adoption as the explanatory variable. While the coefficient is positive, it is not statistically significant,


Table A.7: Effects of AI Use on Firm Productivity

Dep var.	(1) $\ln TFP_{ft}$	(2) $\ln TFP_{ft}$	(3) $\ln TFP_{ft}$	(4) $\ln TFP_{ft}$	(5) $\ln TFP_{ft}$	(6) $\ln TFP_{ft}$
AI_{ft}^{Pool}	0.0376 (0.0262)			0.0353 (0.0259)		
AI_{ft}^S		-0.0177 (0.0415)			-0.0295 (0.0426)	
AI_{ft}^{NS}			0.0409** (0.0188)			0.0439** (0.0185)
Observations	36,900	36,900	36,900	36,899	36,899	36,899
Adjusted R^2	0.664	0.664	0.664	0.647	0.647	0.647
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>						
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: The dependent variable is the total factor productivity of firm f in year t . Column (1) - (3) use productivity estimated from the moment condition based on intermediate inputs. Column (4) - (6) use productivity estimated from the moment condition based on investment. AI_{ft}^{Pool} , AI_{ft}^S and AI_{ft}^{NS} represent overall AI use, sales-related AI use, and non-sales AI use, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

suggesting no systematic link with productivity. Column (2) focuses on sales-related AI, and similarly finds an insignificant, slightly negative effect—consistent with its role in improving demand prediction and reducing market frictions rather than enhancing production efficiency. In contrast, Column (3) shows that non-sales AI—covering production, logistics, and management—is significantly associated with higher productivity. Columns (4)–(6) confirm these findings using an alternative estimation approach. Overall, the results underscore that sales-related AI improves market allocation rather than total factor productivity, and that distinguishing between functional types of AI adoption is essential for understanding firm-level impacts—an aspect often overlooked in existing research.


D.2 Robustness Checks: Figure of Placebo Tests



Price Dispersion

Quantity Dispersion

Panel A: Transaction-Level Dispersion



Price Dispersion

Quantity Dispersion

Panel B: Destination-Level Dispersion

Figure A.7: Placebo Test for Estimated Effects of AI Adoption

Note: In each iteration, we randomly reassign the AI adoption intensity across firms and re-estimate the baseline regression using the permuted treatment variable. We repeat this procedure 500 times and record the estimated coefficients on the placebo variable. The histograms plot the distribution of these coefficients for price dispersion (left) and quantity dispersion (right), separately for transaction-level data (Panel A) and destination-level data (Panel B). The vertical dashed lines indicate the coefficients obtained using the actual AI adoption intensity, showing that the baseline estimates lie well outside the placebo distribution.